James Andreoni

James Andreoni

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James Andreoni

University of California, San Diego (UCSD)

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

39Years (1988-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 March 2002 in Econometrica
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JAJames Andreoni
James Andreoni
JMJohn Miller
John Miller

1 February 2001 in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
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JAJames Andreoni
James Andreoni
LVLise Vesterlund
Lise Vesterlund
We study gender differences in altruism by examining a modified dictator game with varying incomes and prices. Our results indicate that the question

1 January 2009 in Econometrica
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JAJames Andreoni
James Andreoni
BBB. Douglas Bernheim
B. Douglas Bernheim
A norm of 50-50 division appears to have considerable force in a wide range of economic environments, both in the real world and in the laboratory. Even in settings where one party unilaterally determines the allocation of a prize (the dictator game), many subjects voluntarily cede exactly half to another individual. The hypothesis that people care about fairness does not by itself account for key experimental patterns. We consider an alternative explanation, which adds the hypothesis that people like to be perceived as fair. The properties of equilibria for the resulting signaling game correspond closely to laboratory observations. The theory has additional testable implications, the validity of which we confirm through new experiments. Copyright 2009 The Econometric Society.

1 December 1988 in Journal of Public Economics
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JAJames Andreoni
James Andreoni

1 February 1995 in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
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JAJames Andreoni
James Andreoni
Experiments on privately provided public goods generally find that subjects are far more cooperative than predicted, while experiments on oligopolies and the commons almost always obtain the Nash-equilibrium predictions, despite being very similar games. This paper examines whether this difference could be due to the fact that with public goods there is a positive externality, while with the others the externality is negative. The result of the experiments is that subjects are more willing to cooperate when the externality is positive, even though the potential outcomes are the same. This suggests a behavioral asymmetry between the warm-glow of doing something good and cold-prickle of doing something bad.

1 May 2001 in Journal of Public Economics
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JAJames Andreoni
James Andreoni
ALArik Levinson
Arik Levinson