Attaullah Shah

Attaullah Shah

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Attaullah Shah

Institute of Management Sciences Peshawar, Pakistan image/svg+xml

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

23Years (2004-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 June 2017 in Journal of Corporate Finance
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ASAttaullah Shah
Attaullah Shah
HSHamid Ali Shah
Hamid Ali Shah
JSJason M. Smith
Jason M. Smith
GLGiuseppe (Joe) Labianca
Giuseppe (Joe) Labianca

1 December 2004 in The Pakistan Development Review
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Journal Article
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ASAttaullah Shah
Attaullah Shah
THTahir Hijazi
Tahir Hijazi
Capital structure refers to the different options used by a firm in financing its assets. Generally, a firm can go for different levels/mixes of debts, equity, or other financial arrangements. It can combine bonds, TFCs, lease financing, bank loans or many other options with equity in an overall attempt to boost the market value of the firm. In their attempt to maximise the overall value, firms differ with respect to capital structures. This has given birth to different capital structure theories that attempt to explain the variation in capital structures of firms over time or across regions. On the other hand, empirical evidence is also not sometime consistent in substantiating a particular capital structure theory.

1 July 2014 in THE LAHORE JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
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Journal Article
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KSKamran Shah
Kamran Shah
ASAttaullah Shah
Attaullah Shah
This study analyzes the impact of corporate governance and ownership structure on earnings management for a sample of 372 firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange over the period 2003–10. We estimate discretionary accruals using four well-known models: Jones (1991); Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995); Kasznik (1999); and Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005). The results indicate that discretionary accruals increase monotonically with the ownership percentage of a firm’s directors, their spouses, children, and other family members. This supports the view that managers who are more entrenched in a firm can more easily influence corporate decisions and accounting figures in a way that may serve their interests. This finding is consistent with prior research evidence on the role of dominant directors in expropriating external minority shareholders in Pakistan. Further, our results indicate that institutional investors play a significant role in constraining earnings management practices. We do not find any evidence that CEO duality, the size of the auditing firm, the number of members on the board of directors, and ownership concentration influence discretionary accruals. Among the control variables, we find that firms that are more profitable, are growing, or have higher leverage actively manage their earnings, while earnings management decreases with the age of the firm. The results are robust to several alternative specifications.

1 December 2016 in Economic Modelling
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Journal Article
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HSHamid Ali Shah
Hamid Ali Shah
ASAttaullah Shah
Attaullah Shah

1 December 2012 in The Pakistan Development Review
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Journal Article
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FAFahad Abdullah
Fahad Abdullah
ASAttaullah Shah
Attaullah Shah
SKSafi Ullah Khan
Safi Ullah Khan
More than two centuries ago, Adam Smith (1776) showed skepticism about the efficiency of joint stock companies because of the separation of management from ownership. He observed that managers of joint stock companies cannot be expected to watch over the business with the same anxious vigilance as owners in a partnership would. Adam Smith’s worry remained buried for a century and a half until Berle and Means (1932) rekindled interest in this area when they hypothesised in their book that dispersed shareholding is an inefficient form of ownership structure. They argued that separation of ownership and management control has changed the role of owner from being active to the passive agent. Dispersed shareholders lack incentives to monitor self-interested managers who possess only a small fraction of the total shareholdings. The propositions by Adam Smith (1776) and Berle and Means (1932) received some support when Jensen and Meckling (1976) tied together the elements of property rights, agency costs, and finance to develop a theory of ownership structure of a firm. Jensen and Meckling asserted that agency costs are real, which the owner can reduce either by increasing ownership stake of the agent in the firm or by incurring monitoring and bonding costs. In early tests, several research studies supported the views of Jensen and Meckling. However, these studies did not account for endogeneity problem.

28 December 2011 in AFRICAN JOURNAL OF BUSINESS MANAGEMENT
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Journal Article
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ASAttaullah Shah
Attaullah Shah