1 September 2005 in European Journal of Developmental Psychology
Children aged three, four and five years, drawn equally from one secular and one religious school in Spain, were questioned about the psychological and biological constraints that apply to two different types of person: an ordinary human being (their best friend) and an extraordinary being (God). Children were asked to assess whether: (1) the knowledge available to either being is constrained by perceptual processes and (2) the life cycle of either being is constrained by biological processes. Three year olds provided few signs of distinguishing between the two types of being. Five year olds, on the other hand, were quite systematic in their differentiation. They judged that the knowledge available to a friend—but not to God—would be constrained by the need for perceptual access and they judged that the life cycle of a friend—but not that of God—would be constrained by the biological processes of birth, growth and death. Implications for current accounts of children's conceptual development are discussed.
1 December 2010 in British Journal of Developmental Psychology
1 November 2005 in Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology
1 January 2010 in Journal of Cognition and Culture
In two studies, children's concepts of various types of ordinarily unobservable entities were examined. Study 1 confirmed earlier findings in showing that children aged 4–9 years are confident of the existence of scientific entities such as germs as well as religious beings such as God. At the same time, both age groups are skeptical of the existence of various mythical beings such as mermaids. In Study 2, older children aged 10–12 years were probed for their concepts of religious as compared to scientific phenomena. Despite considerable confidence in each type, older children differentiated between them, both with respect to their level of confidence and their pattern of justification.
28 January 2024 in Children and Youth Services Review
1 January 2010 in Cognitive Development