Francesc Trillas

Francesc Trillas

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Francesc Trillas

Department of Applied Economics, School of Economics and Business, Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB), Spain

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

26Years (2001-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 July 2005 in Oxford Economic Papers
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
PLPAUL LEVINE
PAUL LEVINE
JSJon Stern
Jon Stern
FTFrancesc Trillas
Francesc Trillas
We examine the hold-up problem of price regulation and compare it with the monetary policy credibility problem. For both, reputational solutions are possible provided that the policymaker is sufficiently far-sighted, but the hold-up problem in regulation turns out to be more serious than the inflation bias problem in monetary policy. Even with far-sighted regulators, a reputational equilibrium with optimal investment is undermined if capital depreciates slowly and consumer demand increases slowly. These results make the Rogoff-delegation solution to the regulatory commitment problem especially attractive. The paper concludes with a short discussion linking these results to the empirical literature on utility regulatory regimes.

1 January 2006 in Review of Network Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JGJordi Gual
Jordi Gual
FTFrancesc Trillas
Francesc Trillas
This paper presents new data on telecommunications reform for a cross section of countries. We measure telecommunications reform along two dimensions: entry barriers and regulatory independence. This data set is combined with a comprehensive set of performance, institutional and political data to analyze the determinants of telecommunications policies. We find that entry barriers are positively associated with the degree to which countries have an interventionist legal tradition, but they are unrelated to the partisan ideology of reforming governments. We also find that countries with weak protection of investors' quasi-rents by other means, and countries with a larger incumbent, are more prone to create independent regulatory agencies, although the latter is a weaker result.

1 February 2005 in Telecommunications Policy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
GBGermà Bel
Germà Bel
FTFrancesc Trillas
Francesc Trillas

1 June 2002 in Telecommunications Policy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
FTFrancesc Trillas
Francesc Trillas

7 July 2022 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
LDLida Díaz-Pinzón
Lida Díaz-Pinzón
LSLya Sierra
Lya Sierra
FTFrancesc Trillas
Francesc Trillas
Urban growth has impacted natural ecosystems such as wetlands. This situation destabilizes the beneficial contributions of nature, generating a socioeconomic effect. There is a need to quantify the benefits of wetlands in developing countries and urban areas, where the growth of cities is fastest. This is the first valuation study of urban and peri-urban wetlands in Colombia. The methodology includes a benefit transfer (BT) method with a geographical information system (GIS) and an exploratory governance analysis. Because there are few studies on the economic valuation of urban wetlands in Latin America, we present a methodology of interest, which can be easily replicated in other cities of this subcontinent. Based on an economic approach, our results find that 76% of the total value of wetlands is provided by ecosystem services (ES) of existence and legacy value, followed by maintenance of the life cycle of migratory species and water supply. Urban areas are identified where users benefit more than areas where the population exerts greater pressure on wetlands. Weak governance is due to the disarticulation between regulation, land-use planning, and the social-ecological system. This research contributes to urban wetland management policies, as well as to sustainable solutions in cities.

31 March 2013 in Information Economics and Policy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DMDaniel Montolio
Daniel Montolio
FTFrancesc Trillas
Francesc Trillas