23 March 2018 in Corporate Governance: An International Review
Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: Does foundation ownership lead to long‐term corporate governance and business behavior in foundation‐owned companies?Research Findings/Insights: Short‐termism has become a serious concern for corporate governance, and this has inspired a search for institutional arrangements to promote long‐term decision‐making. In this paper, we call attention to long‐term ownership by industrial foundations, which is common in Northern Europe but little known in the rest of the world. We use a unique Danish data set to document that industrial foundations are long‐term owners that practice long‐term governance. We show that foundation ownership is highly stable compared to other ownership structures. Foundation‐owned companies replace managers less frequently. They have conservative capital structures with low financial leverage. They score higher on an index of long‐termism in finance, investment, and employment. They survive longer. Overall, our paper supports the hypothesis that corporate time horizons are influenced by ownership structures, and particularly that industrial foundations possess characteristics that promote long‐termism. Policymakers, business owners, and managers interested in promoting long‐term governance models should therefore reconsider the role of ownership structure.Theoretical/Academic Implications: This paper supports the hypothesis that time horizons are influenced by ownership commitment and particularly that industrial foundations promote long‐termism. We contribute to the corporate governance literature by further developing the concept of long‐termism as a multi‐faceted corporate governance concept associated with ownership commitment. We also show that foundation ownership is associated with long‐termism.Practitioner/Policy Implications: Policymakers interested in promoting long‐termism should encourage long‐term ownership, for example by industrial foundations. Practitioners should consider the importance of ownership commitment in ensuring long‐term corporate governance.
20 July 2010 in Corporate Governance: An International Review
17 November 2021 in Journal of Participation and Employee Ownership
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to give an updated overview of the research on employee ownership. What does the scientific literature reveal about advantages and disadvantages? What can be learned from different models used in Italy, France, Mondragon (Spain), UK and US with many employee-owned firms in contrast to Denmark.Design/methodology/approach: A structured review of the literature on employee. The paper identifies different mechanisms leading to effects on productivity, job stability, distribution, investment etc., and reviews the empirical evidence. The main barriers and drivers are identified and different models for employee ownership in Italy, France, Mondragon (Spain), UK and US are reviewed to identify potential models for a country like Denmark with few employee-owned firms.Findings: The article gives an overview over the theoretical predictions and the main empirical evidence of the effects of employee ownership. The pros are greater employee identification with the firm and increased productivity reinforced by increased participation. Employee-owned firms have more equal distribution of wages and more stable employment, and they have greater mutual control between employees and fewer middle managers. The motivation effects may be smaller for large firms and lack of capital may lead to lower levels of investments and capital per employee.Originality/value: Comprehensive and updated literature review on the effects and successful formats of employee ownership to identify models for implementation in countries with few employee-owned firms.
20 August 2019 in British Journal of Industrial Relations
5 March 2020 in Corporate Ownership and Control
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. Abstract A new strand of corporate governance literature on
31 January 2011 in International Review of Financial Analysis