14 September 2012 in Leukemia & Lymphoma
The optimal therapy and radiation dose for patients with localized primary cutaneous B-cell lymphoma (PCBCL) are unknown. We retrospectively identified 23 patients with localized (T1–T2) PCBCL treated with definitive radiation to doses ranging from 30 to 44 Gy (median, 36 Gy). With a median follow-up of 4.8 years, the 5-year overall survival rate was 100%, the relapse-free survival rate was 71% (95% confidence interval, 46–86%) and there were no local recurrences, suggesting that radiotherapy to a dose of 30 Gy may be sufficient for cure.
1 February 2009 in Pacific Historical Review
This article reproduces in its entirety a recently discovered document pertaining to the Draft Understanding between Japan and the United States that establishes the existence of hitherto unknown communication between the Imperial Japanese Navy and Ambassador Nomura Kichisaburō. It challenges the long-standing historical consensus that Nomura worked independently of Tokyo in preparing the Draft Understanding. It reassesses Nomura's role in the confused process that led the Japanese government to conceive of the Draft Understanding as an American proposal and stresses the extent to which Navy Minister Oikawa Koshirō was responsible for bringing the Draft Understanding to the point that it actually offered a chance at rapprochement. Finally, it investigates Oikawa's supine failure to act on his true responsibilities. In short, this article revises our understanding of a fateful step on the Japanese navy's path to Pearl Harbor.
1 October 1993 in Environmental Health Perspectives
14 June 2014 in Journal of American-East Asian Relations
The Australian government in January 1940 appointed Richard Gardiner Casey minister to the United States. He sought both U.S. support for Britain in its war against Nazi Germany, and a U.S. guarantee to preserve Australian security in the face of an aggressive and threatening Japan. When Casey’s mission ended in March 1942, the United States had entered war in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. The limits to Casey’s ministerial influence were such, however, that one hardly can credit him with having delivered U.S. belligerency. The existing literature nonetheless locates merit in Casey’s ministerial mission, particularly in his highly effective public diplomacy and also in his ability to remain abreast of key U.S. decisions and strategy. This essay takes no particular issue with these findings. Instead, it finds value elsewhere in Casey’s mission, and in particular in the delicate balance he struck between his twin loyalties, to both Australia and the British Empire. It also departs from the existing literature insofar as it identifies a number of issues and episodes that call into question Casey’s accomplishments and acumen.