During its nascent stages, programmable logic controllers (PLCs) were made robust to sustain tough industrial environments, but little care was taken to raise defenses against potential cyberthreats. The recent interconnectivity of legacy PLCs and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems with corporate networks and the Internet has significantly increased the threats to critical infrastructure. To counter these threats, researchers have put their efforts in finding defense mechanisms that can protect the SCADA network and the PLCs. Encryption and intrusion prevention systems (IPSs) have been used by many organizations to protect data and the network against cyber-attacks. However, since PLC vendors do not make available information about their hardware or software, it becomes challenging for researchers to embed security mechanisms into their devices. This letter describes an alternative design using an open source PLC that was modified to encrypt all data it sends over the network, independently of the protocol used. Additionally, a machine learning-based IPS was added to the PLC network stack providing a secure mechanism against network flood attacks like denial of service (DoS). Experimental results indicated that the encryption layer and the IPS increased the security of the link between the PLC and the supervisory software, preventing interception, injection, and DoS attacks.
Researchers from various cross disciplinary fields such as power systems, data science, and cybersecurity face two distinct challenges. First, the lack of a comprehensive test bed that integrates industry standard hardware, software, and wide area measurement system (WAMS) components and protocols impedes the study of cybersecurity issues including vulnerabilities associated with WAMS components and the consequences of exploitation of vulnerabilities. Second, a lack of comprehensive labeled Synchrophasor data along with other system related information imposes challenges to the development and evaluation of data mining algorithms that can classify power system cyber-power events. In this paper, a WAMS cyber-physical test bed was developed using a real time digital simulator with hardware-in-the-loop simulation. Commercial control and monitoring devices, hardware, software, and industry standard communication networks and protocols were combined with custom MATLAB, Python, and AutoIt scripts to model realistic power system contingencies and cyber-attacks. An automated simulation and control engine was developed to randomize modeled cyber-power events including power system faults, contingencies, control actions, and cyber-attacks. Scripts were added to capture heterogenous sensor data and create ground truth labeled datasets. The WAMS cyber-physical test bed is capable of simulating various sized power systems and creating datasets without altering the hardware configuration. A WAMS architecture is presented to document the integration of various components. Finally, test bed applications, simulated cyber-power scenarios, the dataset development process, and selected results are presented.
Electricity transmission systems are networked cyber physical systems that are subject to many well-known control, weather, and equipment failure related contingencies which can disrupt power delivery. Cyber-attacks against electric transmission systems are another class of contingency which can disrupt power delivery. Wide area monitoring systems (WAMSs) enhanced with phasor measurement units provide high volume and high velocity power system sensor data which can be combined with traditional power system data sources and cyber data sources to enable real time detection of both types of contingencies. This paper describes research toward a cyber-power event and intrusion detection system (EIDS) which can be used for multiclass or binary-class classification of traditional power system contingencies and cyber-attacks. The continuous streams of high speed data from WAMS pose significant challenges in data storage, management, and handling. Data stream mining addresses the continuous data problem and can deal with very large data sizes. Hoeffding adaptive trees (HAT) augmented with the drift detection method (DDM) and adaptive windowing (ADWIN) can effectively be used to classify traditional and cyber contingencies in real time. Experiments performed for this paper demonstrate HAT + DDM + ADWIN provides classification accuracy of greater than 94% for multiclass and greater than 98% for binary class classification for a dataset with artifacts from 45 classes of cyber-power contingencies. Results also show that HAT + DDM + ADWIN has a small memory foot print and a fast evaluation time which enables real time EIDS.
21 December 2016 in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Non-nested generalized exemplars (NNGEs) is a state of the art data mining algorithm which uses distance between a new example and a set of exemplars for classification. The state extraction method (STEM) preprocesses power system wide area measurement system data to reduce data size while maintaining critical patterns. Together NNGE+STEM make an effective event and intrusion detection system which can effectively classify power system events and cyber-attacks in real time. This paper documents the results of two experiments in which NNGE+STEM was used to classify cyber power contingency, control action, and cyber-attack events. Experimental results show that NNGE+STEM achieved greater than 94 and 97% accuracy for multiclass and binary class classification. Additionally, the NNGE+STEM false positive rate was below 0.5%, the average classification time was 0.2 ms, and the classifier had low memory requirements.