Jincheol Ha

Jincheol Ha

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Jincheol Ha

KAIST

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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25 May 2022
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
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JHJincheol Ha
Jincheol Ha
SKSeongkwang Kim
Seongkwang Kim
BLByeonghak Lee
Byeonghak Lee
JLJooyoung Lee
Jooyoung Lee
MSMincheol Son
Mincheol Son

27 October 2020 in IEEE Access
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Journal Article
Open access
JHJincheol Ha
Jincheol Ha
SKSeongkwang Kim
Seongkwang Kim
WCWonseok Choi
Wonseok Choi
JLJooyoung Lee
Jooyoung Lee
DMDukjae Moon
Dukjae Moon
JCJihoon Cho
Jihoon Cho
The $\mathsf {Rasta}$ cipher, proposed by Dobraunig et al. (CRYPTO 2018), is an HE-friendly cipher enjoying the fewest ANDs per bit and the lowest ANDdepth among the existing ciphers. A novel feature of $\mathsf {Rasta}$ is that its affine layers are freshly and randomly generated for every encryption. In this paper, we propose a new variant of $\mathsf {Rasta}$ , dubbed $\mathsf {Masta}$ . Similarly to $\mathsf {Rasta}$ , $\mathsf {Masta}$ takes as input a (master) secret key and a nonce, and generates a keystream block for each counter. On the other hand, $\mathsf {Masta}$ has two main differences from $\mathsf {Rasta}$ : $\mathsf {Masta}$ uses modular arithmetic to support HE schemes over a non-binary plaintext space, and it uses a smaller number of random bits in the affine layers by defining them with finite field multiplication. In this way, $\mathsf {Masta}$ outperforms $\mathsf {Rasta}$ in a transciphering framework with $\mathsf {BGV}/ \mathsf {FV}$ -style HE schemes. Our implementation shows that $\mathsf {Masta}$ is 505 to 592 times faster in terms of the throughput on the client-side, while 4792 to 6986 times faster on the server-side.

15 November 2023
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Conference Paper
Open access
SKSeongkwang Kim
Seongkwang Kim
JHJincheol Ha
Jincheol Ha
MSMincheol Son
Mincheol Son
BLByeonghak Lee
Byeonghak Lee
DMDukjae Moon
Dukjae Moon
JLJooyoung Lee
Jooyoung Lee
Post-quantum signature schemes based on the MPC-in-the-Head (MPCitH) paradigm are recently attracting significant attention as their security solely depends on the one-wayness of the underlying primitive, providing diversity for the hardness assumption in post-quantum cryptography. Recent MPCitH-friendly ciphers have been designed using simple algebraic S-boxes operating on a large field in order to improve the performance of the resulting signature schemes. Due to their simple algebraic structures, their security against algebraic attacks should be comprehensively studied. In this paper, we refine algebraic cryptanalysis of power mapping based S-boxes over binary extension fields, and cryptographic primitives based on such S-boxes. In particular, for the Gröbner basis attack over ⅇ2, we experimentally show that the exact number of Boolean quadratic equations obtained from the underlying S-boxes is critical to correctly estimate the theoretic complexity based on the degree of regularity. Similarly, it turns out that the XL attack might be faster when all possible quadratic equations are found and used from the S-boxes. This refined cryptanalysis leads to more precise algebraic analysis of cryptographic primitives based on algebraic S-boxes. Considering the refined algebraic cryptanalysis, we propose a new one-way function, dubbed AIM, as an MPCitH-friendly symmetric primitive with high resistance to algebraic attacks. The security of AIM is comprehensively analyzed with respect to algebraic, statistical, quantum, and generic attacks. AIM is combined with the BN++ proof system, yielding a new signature scheme, dubbed AIM. Our implementation shows that AIM outperforms existing signature schemes based on symmetric primitives in terms of signature size and signing time.

19 November 2025
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Conference Paper
Open access
RWRuida Wang
Ruida Wang
JHJincheol Ha
Jincheol Ha
XSXuan Shen
Xuan Shen
Xianhui LUXianhui LU
Xianhui LU
CCChunling Chen
Chunling Chen
JLJooyoung Lee
Jooyoung Lee