Thomas Allen

Thomas Allen

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Thomas Allen

Manchester Centre for Health Economics, The University of Manchester, Manchester, UK

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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12 January 2022 in Medical Decision Making
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
TAThomas Allen
Thomas Allen
DGDorte Gyrd-Hansen
Dorte Gyrd-Hansen
SKSøren Rud Kristensen
Søren Rud Kristensen
AOAnne Sophie Oxholm
Anne Sophie Oxholm
LPLine Bjørnskov Pedersen
Line Bjørnskov Pedersen
MPMario Pezzino
Mario Pezzino
Background: Many physicians are experiencing increasing demands from both their patients and society. Evidence is scarce on the consequences of the pressure on physicians’ decision making. We present a theoretical framework and predict that increasing pressure may make physicians disregard societal welfare when treating patients. Setting: We test our prediction on general practitioners’ antibiotic-prescribing choices. Because prescribing broad-spectrum antibiotics does not require microbiological testing, it can be performed more quickly than prescribing for narrow-spectrum antibiotics and is therefore often preferred by the patient. In contrast, from a societal perspective, inappropriate prescribing of broad-spectrum antibiotics should be minimized as it may contribute to antimicrobial resistance in the general population. Methods: We combine longitudinal survey data and administrative data from 2010 to 2017 to create a balanced panel of up to 1072 English general practitioners (GPs). Using a series of linear models with GP fixed effects, we estimate the importance of different sources of pressure for GPs’ prescribing. Results: We find that the percentage of broad-spectrum antibiotics prescribed increases by 6.4% as pressure increases on English GPs. The link between pressure and prescribing holds for different sources of pressure. Conclusions: Our findings suggest that there may be societal costs of physicians working under pressure. Policy makers need to take these costs into account when evaluating existing policies as well as when introducing new policies affecting physicians’ work pressure. An important avenue for further research is also to determine the underlying mechanisms related to the different sources of pressure.JEL-code: I11, J28, J45 Highlights: Many physicians are working under increasing pressure. We test the importance of pressure on physicians’ prescribing of antibiotics. The prescribed rate of broad-spectrum antibiotics increases with pressure. Policy makers should be aware of the societal costs of pressured physicians. [ ]

1 July 2014 in Risk Management and Healthcare Policy
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
TAThomas Allen
Thomas Allen
TMThomas Mason
Thomas Mason
WWWilliam Whittaker
William Whittaker
Increasingly, financial incentives are being used in health care as a result of increasing demand for health care coupled with fiscal pressures. Financial incentive schemes are one approach by which the system may incentivize providers of health care to improve productivity and/or adapt to better quality provision. Pay for performance (P4P) is an example of a financial incentive which seeks to link providers' payments to some measure of performance. This paper provides a discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of P4P, gives an overview of the health P4P evidence base, and provide a detailed case study of a particularly large scheme from the English National Health Service. Lessons are then drawn from the evidence base. Overall, we find that the evidence for the effectiveness of P4P for improving quality of care in primary care is mixed. This is to some extent due to the fact that the P4P schemes used in primary care are also mixed. There are many different schemes that incentivize different aspects of care in different ways and in different settings, making evaluation problematic. The Quality and Outcomes Framework in the United Kingdom is the largest example of P4P in primary care. Evidence suggests incentivized quality initially improved following the introduction of the Quality and Outcomes Framework, but this was short-lived. If P4P in primary care is to have a long-term future, the question about scheme effectiveness (perhaps incorporating the identification and assessment of potential risk factors) needs to be answered robustly. This would require that new schemes be designed from the onset to support their evaluation: control and treatment groups, coupled with before and after data.

1 January 2017 in Social Science & Medicine
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TAThomas Allen
Thomas Allen
WWWilliam Whittaker
William Whittaker
MSMatt Sutton
Matt Sutton

11 November 2014 in Health Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
TAThomas Allen
Thomas Allen
EFEleonora Fichera
Eleonora Fichera
MSMatt Sutton
Matt Sutton

3 April 2019 in Emergency Medicine Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
TAThomas Allen
Thomas Allen
KWKieran Walshe
Kieran Walshe
NPNathan Proudlove
Nathan Proudlove
MSMatt Sutton
Matt Sutton
Introduction Hospital inspection and the publication of inspection ratings are widely used regulatory interventions that may improve hospital performance by providing feedback, creating incentives to change and promoting choice. However, evidence that these interventions assess performance accurately and lead to improved performance is scarce. Methods We calculated six standard indicators of emergency department (ED) performance for 118 hospitals in England whose EDs were inspected by the Care Quality Commission, the national regulator in England, between 2013 and 2016. We linked these to inspection dates and subsequent rating scores. We used multilevel linear regression models to estimate the relationship between prior performance and subsequent rating score and the relationship between rating score and post-inspection performance. Results We found no relationship between performance on any of the six indicators prior to inspection and the subsequent rating score. There was no change in performance on any of the six indicators following inspection for any rating score. In each model, CIs were wide indicating no statistically significant relationships. Discussion We found no association between established performance indicators and rating scores. This might be because the inspection and rating process adds little to the external performance management that EDs receive. It could also indicate the limited ability of hospitals to improve ED performance because of extrinsic factors that are beyond their control.

16 November 2022 in PLOS Medicine
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SRSarah Rodgers
Sarah Rodgers
ATAmelia C. Taylor
Amelia C. Taylor
SRStephen A. Roberts
Stephen A. Roberts
TAThomas Allen
Thomas Allen
DADarren M. Ashcroft
Darren M. Ashcroft
AAAnthony J. Avery
Anthony J. Avery
Background: We previously reported on a randomised trial demonstrating the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of a pharmacist-led information technology intervention (PINCER). We sought to investigate whether PINCER was effective in reducing hazardous prescribing when rolled out at scale in UK general practices. Methods and findings: We used a multiple interrupted time series design whereby successive groups of general practices received the PINCER intervention between September 2015 and April 2017. We used 11 prescribing safety indicators to identify potentially hazardous prescribing and collected data over a maximum of 16 quarterly time periods. The primary outcome was a composite of all the indicators; a composite for indicators associated with gastrointestinal (GI) bleeding was also reported, along with 11 individual indicators of hazardous prescribing. Data were analysed using logistic mixed models for the quarterly event numbers with the appropriate denominator, and calendar time included as a covariate. PINCER was implemented in 370 (94.1%) of 393 general practices covering a population of almost 3 million patients in the East Midlands region of England; data were successfully extracted from 343 (92.7%) of these practices. For the primary composite outcome, the PINCER intervention was associated with a decrease in the rate of hazardous prescribing of 16.7% (adjusted odds ratio (aOR) 0.83, 95% confidence interval (CI) 0.80 to 0.86) at 6 months and 15.3% (aOR 0.85, 95% CI 0.80 to 0.90) at 12 months postintervention. The unadjusted rate of hazardous prescribing reduced from 26.4% (22,503 patients in the numerator/853,631 patients in the denominator) to 20.1% (11,901 patients in the numerator/591,364 patients in the denominator) at 6 months and 19.1% (3,868 patients in the numerator/201,992 patients in the denominator). The greatest reduction in hazardous prescribing associated with the intervention was observed for the indicators associated with GI bleeding; for the GI composite indicator, there was a decrease of 23.9% at both 6 months (aOR 0.76, 95% CI 0.73 to 0.80) and 12 months (aOR 0.76, 95% CI 0.70 to 0.82) postintervention. The unadjusted rate of hazardous prescribing reduced from 31.4 (16,185 patients in the numerator/515,879 patients in the denominator) to 21.2% (7,607 patients in the numerator/358,349 patients in the denominator) at 6 months and 19.5% (2,369 patients in the numerator/121,534 patients in the denominator). We adjusted for calendar time and practice, but since this was an observational study, the findings may have been influenced by unknown confounding factors or behavioural changes unrelated to the PINCER intervention. Data were also not collected for all practices at 6 months and 12 months postintervention. Conclusions: The PINCER intervention, when rolled out at scale in routine clinical practice, was associated with a reduction in hazardous prescribing by 17% and 15% at 6 and 12 months postintervention. The greatest reductions in hazardous prescribing were for indicators associated with risk of GI bleeding. These findings support the wider national rollout of PINCER in England.