Ruimeng Hu

Ruimeng Hu

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Ruimeng Hu

Department of Mathematics, Department of Statistics and Applied Probability, University of California, Santa Barbara, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2021 in Communications in Mathematical Sciences
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RHRuimeng Hu
Ruimeng Hu
International Press of Boston - publishers of scholarly mathematical and scientific journals and books

1 January 2024 in Numerical Algebra, Control & Optimization
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RHRuimeng Hu
Ruimeng Hu
MLMathieu LAURIERE
Mathieu LAURIERE
Stochastic optimal control and games have a wide range of applications, from finance and economics to social sciences, robotics, and energy management. Many real-world applications involve complex models that have driven the development of sophisticated numerical methods. Recently, computational methods based on machine learning have been developed for solving stochastic control problems and games. In this review, we focus on deep learning methods that have unlocked the possibility of solving such problems, even in high dimensions or when the structure is very complex, beyond what traditional numerical methods can achieve. We consider mostly the continuous time and continuous space setting. Many of the new approaches build on recent neural-network-based methods for solving high-dimensional partial differential equations or backward stochastic differential equations, or on model-free reinforcement learning for Markov decision processes that have led to breakthrough results. This paper provides an introduction to these methods and summarizes the state-of-the-art works at the crossroad of machine learning and stochastic control and games.

4 January 2024 in SIAM Journal on Numerical Analysis
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JHJiequn Han
Jiequn Han
RHRuimeng Hu
Ruimeng Hu
JLJihao Long
Jihao Long
One of the core problems in mean-field control and mean-field games is to solve the corresponding McKean–Vlasov forward-backward stochastic differential equations (MV-FBSDEs). Most existing methods are tailored to special cases in which the mean-field interaction only depends on expectation or other moments and thus are inadequate to solve problems when the mean-field interaction has full distribution dependence. In this paper, we propose a novel deep learning method for computing MV-FBSDEs with a general form of mean-field interactions. Specifically, built on fictitious play, we recast the problem into repeatedly solving standard FBSDEs with explicit coefficient functions. These coefficient functions are used to approximate the MV-FBSDEs’ model coefficients with full distribution dependence, and are updated by solving another supervising learning problem using training data simulated from the last iteration’s FBSDE solutions. We use deep neural networks to solve standard BSDEs and approximate coefficient functions in order to solve high-dimensional MV-FBSDEs. Under proper assumptions on the learned functions, we prove that the convergence of the proposed method is free of the curse of dimensionality (CoD) by using a class of integral probability metrics previously developed in [J. Han, R. Hu, and J. Long, Stochastic Process. Appl., 164 (2023), pp. 242–287]. The proved theorem shows the advantage of the method in high dimensions. We present the numerical performance in high-dimensional MV-FBSDE problems, including a mean-field game example of the well-known Cucker–Smale model, the cost of which depends on the full distribution of the forward process.

22 July 2021 in Mathematics of Control, Signals, and Systems
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JHJiequn Han
Jiequn Han
RHRuimeng Hu
Ruimeng Hu

1 January 2022 in Frontiers of Mathematical Finance
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JHJiequn Han
Jiequn Han
RHRuimeng Hu
Ruimeng Hu
JLJihao Long
Jihao Long
Stochastic differential games have been used extensively to model agents' competitions in finance, for instance, in P2P lending platforms from the Fintech industry, the banking system for systemic risk, and insurance markets. The recently proposed machine learning algorithm, deep fictitious play, provides a novel and efficient tool for finding Markovian Nash equilibrium of large \begin{document}$ N $\end{document}-player asymmetric stochastic differential games [J. Han and R. Hu, Mathematical and Scientific Machine Learning Conference, pages 221-245, PMLR, 2020]. By incorporating the idea of fictitious play, the algorithm decouples the game into \begin{document}$ N $\end{document} sub-optimization problems, and identifies each player's optimal strategy with the deep backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) method parallelly and repeatedly. In this paper, we prove the convergence of deep fictitious play (DFP) to the true Nash equilibrium. We can also show that the strategy based on DFP forms an \begin{document}$ \epsilon $\end{document}-Nash equilibrium. We generalize the algorithm by proposing a new approach to decouple the games, and present numerical results of large population games showing the empirical convergence of the algorithm beyond the technical assumptions in the theorems.

4 December 2023 in SIAM Journal on Financial Mathematics
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CGChengfan Gao
Chengfan Gao
SGSiping Gao
Siping Gao
RHRuimeng Hu
Ruimeng Hu
ZZZimu Zhu
Zimu Zhu
The optimal stopping problem is one of the core problems in financial markets, with broad applications such as pricing American and Bermudan options. The deep BSDE method [J. Han, A. Jentzen, and W. E, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 115 (2018), pp. 8505–8510] has shown great power in solving high-dimensional forward-backward stochastic differential equations and has inspired many applications. However, the method solves backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) in a forward manner, which cannot be used for optimal stopping problems that in general require running BSDE backwardly. To overcome this difficulty, a recent paper [H. Wang et al., Deep Learning-Based BSDE Solver for LIBOR Market Model with Application to Bermudan Swaption Pricing and Hedging, arXiv:1807.06622, 2018] proposed the backward deep BSDE method to solve the optimal stopping problem. In this paper, we provide a rigorous theory for the backward deep BSDE method. Specifically, (1) we derive the a posteriori error estimation, i.e., the error of the numerical solution can be bounded by the training loss function; and (2) we give an upper bound of the loss function, which can be sufficiently small subject to universal approximations. We give two numerical examples, which present consistent performance with the proved theory.