Despite the prominence of non-visual semantic features for some words (e.g., siren or thunder), little is known about when and how the meanings of those words that refer to auditory objects can be acquired in early infancy. With associative learning being an important mechanism of word learning, we ask the question whether associations between sounds and words lead to similar learning effects as associations between visual objects and words. In an event-related potential (ERP) study, 10- to 12-month-old infants were presented with pairs of environmental sounds and pseudowords in either a consistent (where sound-word mapping can occur) or inconsistent manner. Subsequently, the infants were presented with sound-pseudoword combinations either matching or violating the consistent pairs from the training phase. In the training phase, we observed word-form familiarity effects and pairing consistency effects for ERPs time-locked to the onset of the word. The test phase revealed N400-like effects for violated pairs as compared to matching pairs. These results indicate that associative word learning is also possible for auditory objects before infants' first birthday. The specific temporal occurrence of the N400-like effect and topological distribution of the ERPs suggests that the object's modality has an impact on how novel words are processed.
Many higher cognitive tasks, such as problem-solving and deliberation are accompanied by the experience of an inner voice in our heads. In this paper, we develop the idea that our own inner speech supports these tasks. We approach the phenomenon of inner speech through a comparison with overt speech – a comparison that is suggested by a Vygotskian approach that focuses on how inner speech develops from overt speech during ontogeny. We argue for the cognitive potency of inner speech by hypothesizing that condensed inner speech may help reduce cognitive load; yet by being pragmatically expanded upon, inner speech may scaffold further cognitive accomplishments. More specifically, as we adopt a Vygotskian perspective, we begin by introducing his notion of internalization and examine in what way inner speech might be condensed. Then the question of whether inner speech is governed by the same pragmatic mechanisms that govern overt speech is posed and answered in the affirmative. We advocate the idea that inner speech aids deliberation due, to some degree, to the manner in which pragmatic principles governing overt speech are re-purposed in inner speech. We close by addressing two objections.