Pascal Cotret

Pascal Cotret

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Pascal Cotret

Lab-STICC, ENSTA Bretagne, Brest, France

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 May 2016 in Microprocessors and Microsystems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PCPascal Cotret
Pascal Cotret
GGGuy Gogniat
Guy Gogniat
MFMartha Johanna Sepúlveda Flórez
Martha Johanna Sepúlveda Flórez

1 July 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MPMoritz Peters
Moritz Peters
NGNicolas Gaudin
Nicolas Gaudin
JTJan Philipp Thoma
Jan Philipp Thoma
VLVianney Lapotre
Vianney Lapotre
PCPascal Cotret
Pascal Cotret
TGTim Güneysu
Tim Güneysu
Randomizing the mapping of addresses to cache entries has proven to be an effective technique for hardening caches against contention-based attacks like Prime+Probe. While attacks and defenses are still evolving, it is clear that randomized caches significantly increase the security against such attacks. However, one aspect that is missing from most analyses of randomized cache architectures is the choice of the replacement policy. Often, only the random- and LRU replacement policies are investigated. However, LRU is not applicable to randomized caches due to its immense hardware overhead, while the random replacement policy is not ideal from a performance and security perspective. In this paper, we explore replacement policies for randomized caches. We develop two new replacement policies and evaluate a total of five replacement policies regarding their security against Prime+Prune+Probe attackers. Moreover, we analyze the effect of the replacement policy on the system's performance and quantify the introduced hardware overhead. We implement randomized caches with configurable replacement policies in software and hardware using a custom cache simulator, gem5, and the CV32E40P RISC-V core. Among others, we show that the construction of eviction sets with our new policy, VARP-64, requires over 25-times more cache accesses than with the random replacement policy while also enhancing overall performance.

29 September 2016
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MWMuhammad Abdul Wahab
Muhammad Abdul Wahab
PCPascal Cotret
Pascal Cotret
MAMounir Nasr Allah
Mounir Nasr Allah
GHGuillaume Hiet
Guillaume Hiet
VLVianney Lapotre
Vianney Lapotre
GGGuy Gogniat
Guy Gogniat
This work details a hardware-assisted approach for information flow tracking implemented on a reconfigurable chip. Current solutions are either time-consuming or hardly portable (modifications of both sofware/hardware layers). This work takes benefits from debug components included in ARMv7 processors to retrieve details on instructions committed by the CPU. First results in terms of silicon area and time overheads are also given.

6 May 2025 in ACM Computing Surveys
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
QDQuentin Ducasse
Quentin Ducasse
PCPascal Cotret
Pascal Cotret
LLLoic LAGADEC
Loic LAGADEC
Programming Language Virtual Machines (VMs) are composed of several components that together execute and manage languages efficiently. They are deployed in virtually all computing systems through modern web browsers. However, vulnerabilities in any VM component pose a significant threat to security and privacy. In this article, we present a survey of software attacks on Just-In-Time (JIT) compilers, which dynamically produce optimized code at run time. We first present an overview and categorization of software attacks and their vectors as presented in the literature, identifying three main attack classes: code injection, code-reuse, and data-only attacks. We show how each can lead to arbitrary code execution. Next, we present a comprehensive taxonomy of defenses, including diversification, strict memory permissions and capability containment. While some were integrated in modern VMs, we draw recommendations for future protections. Securing JIT compilers remains challenging due to inherent conflicts with security principles, such as W ^ X ( W ritable XOR e X ecutable), and the complexity of JIT optimizations. Finally, we examine how newer architectures, like ARMv8 and RISC-V, face similar threats. With RISC-V’s open architecture offering a promising platform for prototyping VM-specific protections and custom security instructions, we discuss hardware-assisted runtime protections and RISC-V extensions that could enhance VM security.

3 October 2026 in Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
LMLouis Morge-Rollet Morge-Rollet
Louis Morge-Rollet Morge-Rollet
CSCamélia Slimani
Camélia Slimani
PGPierre Garreau
Pierre Garreau
LLLaurent Lemarchand
Laurent Lemarchand
VLVincent Lannurien
Vincent Lannurien
JBJalil Boukhobza
Jalil Boukhobza