1 September 2006 in European Journal of Operational Research
1 September 2017 in Computers & Industrial Engineering
1 March 2005 in Annals of Operations Research
1 September 2022 in European Journal of Operational Research
1 January 2011 in International Journal of Production Research
This paper explores coordination of a (global) supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer via a revenue-sharing contract, where a product quality assurance policy is provided and the utility of consumer is sensitive to product (physical) quality, service quality (i.e., reciprocal of delivery lead-time) and retail price. We assume that the supply chain operates in a make-to-order (MTO) environment and a defective product is returned to the manufacturer for remanufacturing free. We give the optimal service quality and pricing decisions of the decentralised supply chain, its coordination mechanism and the Pareto condition of coordination mechanism. In the decentralised setting, although a higher defective rate of the final product implies a higher cost for the manufacturer, the optimal service quality first decreases and then increases and the optimal retail price decreases as the defective rate increases, which differs from the effects of the unit remanufacturing cost due to the service reliability constraint and the effects of the defective rate on the market scale and lead-time sensitivity; when the supply chain is coordinated, comparing to the traditional models without considering service quality, the manufacturer charges the retailer a higher unit wholesale price. The effect of the defective rate on the Pareto range of coordination mechanism is inconsistent with that of the unit production cost because the defective rate directly influences the demand rate.
9 January 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management
This paper investigates the price and collection rate decisions and reverse channel structure strategy of a dyadic closed-loop supply chain with corporate social responsibility and green consumers, within which the manufacturer and green consumers exhibit environmental responsibility behaviors. The manufacturer decides who to collect used products. We find that 1) the retail price, collection rate, and sales quantity may simultaneously increase with the environmental responsibility degree of the manufacturer/green consumers; 2) adopting the reverse channel with manufacturer-managed collection leads to a lower retail price, higher collection rate, or higher sales quantity than implementing the reverse channel with retailer-managed collection under certain conditions; 3) the centralized system benefits from manufacturer-managed collection if and only if the collection effectiveness of the retailer is lower than that of the manufacturer; 4) the manufacturer/supply chain benefits from manufacturer-managed collection if and only if the collection effectiveness of the retailer is relatively low; and 5) the social welfare of the decentralized system under manufacturer-managed collection may be higher than that under retailer-managed collection.