Alison Gopnik

Alison Gopnik

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Alison Gopnik

University of California Berkeley

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

36Years (1991-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2012 in Psychological Bulletin
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Journal Article
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AGAlison Gopnik
Alison Gopnik
HWHenry M. Wellman
Henry M. Wellman
We propose a new version of the "theory theory" grounded in the computational framework of probabilistic causal models and Bayesian learning. Probabilistic models allow a constructivist but rigorous and detailed approach to cognitive development. They also explain the learning of both more specific causal hypotheses and more abstract framework theories. We outline the new theoretical ideas, explain the computational framework in an intuitive and nontechnical way, and review an extensive but relatively recent body of empirical results that supports these ideas. These include new studies of the mechanisms of learning. Children infer causal structure from statistical information, through their own actions on the world and through observations of the actions of others. Studies demonstrate these learning mechanisms in children from 16 months to 4 years old and include research on causal statistical learning, informal experimentation through play, and imitation and informal pedagogy. They also include studies of the variability and progressive character of intuitive theory change, particularly theory of mind. These studies investigate both the physical and the psychological and social domains. We conclude with suggestions for further collaborative projects between developmental and computational cognitive scientists.

1 June 2020 in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
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Journal Article
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AGAlison Gopnik
Alison Gopnik
I argue that the evolution of our life history, with its distinctively long, protected human childhood, allows an early period of broad hypothesis search and exploration, before the demands of goal-directed exploitation set in. This cognitive profile is also found in other animals and is associated with early behaviours such as neophilia and play. I relate this developmental pattern to computational ideas about explore–exploit trade-offs, search and sampling, and to neuroscience findings. I also present several lines of empirical evidence suggesting that young human learners are highly exploratory, both in terms of their search for external information and their search through hypothesis spaces. In fact, they are sometimes more exploratory than older learners and adults. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Life history and learning: how childhood, caregiving and old age shape cognition and culture in humans and other animals’.

24 July 2017 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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AGAlison Gopnik
Alison Gopnik
SOShaun O’grady
Shaun O’grady
CLChristopher G. Lucas
Christopher G. Lucas
TGThomas L. Griffiths
Thomas L. Griffiths
AWAdrienne Wente
Adrienne Wente
RDRonald E. Dahl
Ronald E. Dahl
How was the evolution of our unique biological life history related to distinctive human developments in cognition and culture? We suggest that the extended human childhood and adolescence allows a balance between exploration and exploitation, between wider and narrower hypothesis search, and between innovation and imitation in cultural learning. In particular, different developmental periods may be associated with different learning strategies. This relation between biology and culture was probably coevolutionary and bidirectional: life-history changes allowed changes in learning, which in turn both allowed and rewarded extended life histories. In two studies, we test how easily people learn an unusual physical or social causal relation from a pattern of evidence. We track the development of this ability from early childhood through adolescence and adulthood. In the physical domain, preschoolers, counterintuitively, perform better than school-aged children, who in turn perform better than adolescents and adults. As they grow older learners are less flexible: they are less likely to adopt an initially unfamiliar hypothesis that is consistent with new evidence. Instead, learners prefer a familiar hypothesis that is less consistent with the evidence. In the social domain, both preschoolers and adolescents are actually the most flexible learners, adopting an unusual hypothesis more easily than either 6-y-olds or adults. There may be important developmental transitions in flexibility at the entry into middle childhood and in adolescence, which differ across domains.

5 August 2012 in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
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DBDaphna Buchsbaum
Daphna Buchsbaum
SBSophie Bridgers
Sophie Bridgers
DWDeena Skolnick Weisberg
Deena Skolnick Weisberg
AGAlison Gopnik
Alison Gopnik
We argue for a theoretical link between the development of an extended period of immaturity in human evolution and the emergence of powerful and wide-ranging causal learning mechanisms, specifically the use of causal models and Bayesian learning. We suggest that exploratory childhood learning, childhood play in particular, and causal cognition are closely connected. We report an empirical study demonstrating one such connection—a link between pretend play and counterfactual causal reasoning. Preschool children given new information about a causal system made very similar inferences both when they considered counterfactuals about the system and when they engaged in pretend play about it. Counterfactual cognition and causally coherent pretence were also significantly correlated even when age, general cognitive development and executive function were controlled for. These findings link a distinctive human form of childhood play and an equally distinctive human form of causal inference. We speculate that, during human evolution, computations that were initially reserved for solving particularly important ecological problems came to be used much more widely and extensively during the long period of protected immaturity.

1 January 2022 in Cognition
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Journal Article
Open access
ELEmily G. Liquin
Emily G. Liquin
AGAlison Gopnik
Alison Gopnik
Intuitively, children appear to be more exploratory than adults, and this exploration seems to help children learn,. However, there have been few clear tests of these ideas. We test whether exploration and learning change across development using a task that presents a "learning trap." In this task, exploitation-maximizing immediate reward and avoiding costs-may lead the learner to draw incorrect conclusions, while exploration may lead to better learning but be more costly. In Studies 1, 2, and 3 we find that preschoolers and early school-aged children explore more than adults and learn the true structure of the environment better. Study 3 demonstrates that children explore more than adults even though they, like adults, predict that exploration will be costly, and it shows that exploration and learning are correlated. Study 4 shows that children's and adults' learning depends on the evidence they generate during exploration: children exposed to adult-like evidence learn like adults, and adults exposed to child-like evidence learn like children. Together, these studies support the idea that children may be more exploratory than adults, and this increased exploration influences learning.

6 April 2015 in Current Directions in Psychological Science
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Journal Article
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AGAlison Gopnik
Alison Gopnik
TGThomas L. Griffiths
Thomas L. Griffiths
CLChristopher G. Lucas
Christopher G. Lucas
We describe a surprising developmental pattern we found in studies involving three different kinds of problems and age ranges. Younger learners are better than older ones at learning unusual abstract causal principles from evidence. We explore two factors that might contribute to this counterintuitive result. The first is that as our knowledge grows, we become less open to new ideas. The second is that younger minds and brains are intrinsically more flexible and exploratory, although they are also less efficient as a result.