Economic complexity highlights the relationship between interdependence (a positional characteristic of elements belonging to a given network or structure) and connectivity (a functional characteristic of elements belonging to a given field of interaction). Positional interdependence (as the one between pieces in a jigsaw puzzle) is central to studies investigating the architecture of a complex system (Simon) while connectivity is central to the analysis of responsiveness patterns in social networks and strategic action fields. This paper discusses the fundamentals of a structural approach to economic and spatial complexity by highlighting the hierarchical arrangement of network elements as a distinctive feature of system identity. The positional distribution of network elements is a fundamental characteristic of complex networks and a central condition constraining the dynamics of those networks through the principle ofrelative structural invariance. The paper investigates the role of this principle by connecting it with the aggregation criterion followed in assigning network elements to specific subsystems. The type of aggregation is essential in determining the resilience properties of the network with respect to specific dynamic impulses. The paper concludes highlighting the need to combine the investigation of positional interdependence with the analysis of connectivity since positional interdependence is fundamental in determining which patterns of connection are more likely to arise (and which ones are excluded), due to the role of alternative properties of relative invariance constraining the feasible transformations in the positions of network elements.
The distinction between constitution, as the set of fundamental normative premises ensuring the cohesion of any given polity, and contract, as the formal covenant agreed upon by the relevant stakeholders in that polity, is central to political economy. This paper outlines a conceptual framework for the political economy of constitution based on the above distinction. Our argument is that constitution in the material sense, that is, as a relatively stable configuration of interests prior to formal arrangements, determines the way in which formal rules and procedures operate within a specific historical context. The paper develops the constitutionalist tradition towards a ‘constitutional heuristic’ that helps to detect feasible organisations of political-economic interests in society. Stratified social systems are rooted in multi-layered connectivity and provide a structure for organising partially overlapping interests beyond purely contractual covenants. This conception of constitution has far-reaching implications for economic policy because it charts a course beyond the dichotomy between consensus and conflict. The political economy of constitution focuses on the multiple interdependencies within the social domain, which give rise to substantive arrangements among stakeholders. This approach enables the identification of policy domains, thresholds and measures congruent with the material constitution of any given society.