Yalin Evren Sagduyu

Yalin Evren Sagduyu

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Yalin Evren Sagduyu

Nexcepta, Gaithersburg, MD, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

18Years (2009-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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4 December 2018 in IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TETugba Erpek
Tugba Erpek
YSYalin E. Sagduyu
Yalin E. Sagduyu
YSYi Shi
Yi Shi

12 September 2022 in IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
DADamilola Adesina
Damilola Adesina
CHChung-Chu Hsieh
Chung-Chu Hsieh
YSYalin E. Sagduyu
Yalin E. Sagduyu
LQLijun Qian
Lijun Qian
Machine learning (ML) provides effective means to learn from spectrum data and solve complex tasks involved in wireless communications. Supported by recent advances in computational resources and algorithmic designs, deep learning (DL) has found success in performing various wireless communication tasks such as signal recognition, spectrum sensing and waveform design. However, ML in general and DL in particular have been found vulnerable to manipulations thus giving rise to a field of study called adversarial machine learning (AML). Although AML has been extensively studied in other data domains such as computer vision and natural language processing, research for AML in the wireless communications domain is still in its early stage. This paper presents a comprehensive review of the latest research efforts focused on AML in wireless communications while accounting for the unique characteristics of wireless systems. First, the background of AML attacks on deep neural networks is discussed and a taxonomy of AML attack types is provided. Various methods of generating adversarial examples and attack mechanisms are also described. In addition, an holistic survey of existing research on AML attacks for various wireless communication problems as well as the corresponding defense mechanisms in the wireless domain are presented. Finally, as new attacks and defense techniques are developed, recent research trends and the overarching future outlook for AML in next-generation wireless communications are discussed.

9 November 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
BKBrian Kim
Brian Kim
YSYalin E. Sagduyu
Yalin E. Sagduyu
KDKemal Davaslioglu
Kemal Davaslioglu
TETugba Erpek
Tugba Erpek
SUSennur Ulukus
Sennur Ulukus
This paper presents channel-aware adversarial attacks against deep learning-based wireless signal classifiers. There is a transmitter that transmits signals with different modulation types. A deep neural network is used at each receiver to classify its over-the-air received signals to modulation types. In the meantime, an adversary transmits an adversarial perturbation (subject to a power budget) to fool receivers into making errors in classifying signals that are received as superpositions of transmitted signals and adversarial perturbations. First, these evasion attacks are shown to fail when channels are not considered in designing adversarial perturbations. Then, realistic attacks are presented by considering channel effects from the adversary to each receiver. After showing that a channel-aware attack is selective (i.e., it affects only the receiver whose channel is considered in the perturbation design), a broadcast adversarial attack is presented by crafting a common adversarial perturbation to simultaneously fool classifiers at different receivers. The major vulnerability of modulation classifiers to over-the-air adversarial attacks is shown by accounting for different levels of information available about the channel, the transmitter input, and the classifier model. Finally, a certified defense based on randomized smoothing that augments training data with noise is introduced to make the modulation classifier robust to adversarial perturbations.

23 February 2022 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XWXueyuan Wang
Xueyuan Wang
MGM. Cenk Gursoy
M. Cenk Gursoy
TETugba Erpek
Tugba Erpek
YSYalin E. Sagduyu
Yalin E. Sagduyu
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are expected to be an integral part of wireless networks, and determining collision-free trajectory in multi-UAV non-cooperative scenarios while collecting data from distributed Internet of Things (IoT) nodes is a challenging task. In this paper, we consider a path planning optimization problem to maximize the collected data from multiple IoT nodes under realistic constraints. The considered multi-UAV non-cooperative scenarios involve random number of other UAVs in addition to the typical UAV, and UAVs do not communicate or share information among each other. We translate the problem into a Markov decision process (MDP) with parameterized states, permissible actions, and detailed reward functions. Dueling double deep Q-network (D3QN) is proposed to learn the decision making policy for the typical UAV, without any prior knowledge of the environment (e.g., channel propagation model and locations of the obstacles) and other UAVs (e.g., their missions, movements, and policies). The proposed algorithm can adapt to various missions in various scenarios, e.g., different numbers and positions of IoT nodes, different amount of data to be collected, and different numbers and positions of other UAVs. Numerical results demonstrate that real-time navigation can be efficiently performed with high success rate, high data collection rate, and low collision rate.

30 October 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YSYalin E. Sagduyu
Yalin E. Sagduyu
YSYi Shi
Yi Shi
TETugba Erpek
Tugba Erpek

20 July 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YSYi Shi
Yi Shi
KDKemal Davaslioglu
Kemal Davaslioglu
YSYalin E. Sagduyu
Yalin E. Sagduyu
The spoofing attack is critical to bypass physical-layer signal authentication. This paper presents a deep learning-based spoofing attack to generate synthetic wireless signals that cannot be statistically distinguished from intended transmissions. The adversary is modeled as a pair of a transmitter and a receiver that build the generator and discriminator of the generative adversarial network, respectively, by playing a minimax game over the air. The adversary transmitter trains a deep neural network to generate the best spoofing signals and fool the best defense trained as another deep neural network at the adversary receiver. Each node (defender or adversary) may have multiple transmitter or receiver antennas. Signals are spoofed by jointly capturing waveform, channel, and radio hardware effects that are inherent to wireless signals under attack. Compared with spoofing attacks using random or replayed signals, the proposed attack increases the probability of misclassifying spoofing signals as intended signals for different network topology and mobility patterns. The adversary transmitter can increase the spoofing attack success by using multiple antennas, while the attack success decreases when the defender receiver uses multiple antennas. For practical deployment, the attack implementation on embedded platforms demonstrates the low latency of generating or classifying spoofing signals.