1 August 2011 in The Accounting Review
Compensation committees face special difficulties when setting pay in the last years of a CEO's tenure. For example, incentives to manipulate earnings for the purpose of enhancing earnings-based compensation are greater in CEOs' terminal years. We predict that compensation committees are aware of these incentives and adjust the relative weights placed on earnings components in the cash compensation function to mitigate the problem. Consistent with our prediction, we find that in CEOs' terminal years, positive changes in discretionary accruals receive significantly less weight than other income components in determining cash compensation. This provides new evidence that not all gains flow through to compensation. We also find that in non-terminal years, managers' compensation is partially shielded from the negative effects of selling, general, and administrative expenditures (SG&A), but this effect reverses in the terminal period, consistent with the compensation committee discouraging investment in legacy assets by outgoing CEOs. Overall, our findings suggest that compensation committees treat components of earnings differently when setting pay in the terminal period. JEL Classifications: M41; J33.
26 October 2021 in Journal of Operations Management
16 May 2011 in Contemporary Accounting Research
1 September 2004 in Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences / Revue Canadienne des Sciences de l'Administration
1 December 2009 in Contemporary Accounting Research
1 January 1999 in Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards Number 94 (FAS 94) requires that firms consolidate all majority-owned subsidiaries, including those that were previously exempt from consolidation requirements due to the dissimilarity of parent/subsidiary operations. Prior to FAS 94, firms disclosed summary information on unconsolidated subsidiaries in their notes. This research demonstrates that, although the overall sample is unbiased, pre–FAS 94 note disclosures were insufficient to enable users to obtain an accurate picture of consolidated leverage for a number of firms. The research also illustrates that firms that underreported subsidiary debt had significantly higher consolidated leverage (as measured using pre–FAS 94 note disclosures) than other firms and that the market appeared to have relied on these inaccurate disclosures in assessing firm value.