Heather A. Wier

Heather A. Wier

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Heather A. Wier

University of Alberta

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

28Years (1999-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 August 2011 in The Accounting Review
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Journal Article
Closed access
MHMark R. Huson
Mark R. Huson
YTYao Tian
Yao Tian
CWChristine I. Wiedman
Christine I. Wiedman
HWHeather A. Wier
Heather A. Wier
Compensation committees face special difficulties when setting pay in the last years of a CEO's tenure. For example, incentives to manipulate earnings for the purpose of enhancing earnings-based compensation are greater in CEOs' terminal years. We predict that compensation committees are aware of these incentives and adjust the relative weights placed on earnings components in the cash compensation function to mitigate the problem. Consistent with our prediction, we find that in CEOs' terminal years, positive changes in discretionary accruals receive significantly less weight than other income components in determining cash compensation. This provides new evidence that not all gains flow through to compensation. We also find that in non-terminal years, managers' compensation is partially shielded from the negative effects of selling, general, and administrative expenditures (SG&A), but this effect reverses in the terminal period, consistent with the compensation committee discouraging investment in legacy assets by outgoing CEOs. Overall, our findings suggest that compensation committees treat components of earnings differently when setting pay in the terminal period. JEL Classifications: M41; J33.

26 October 2021 in Journal of Operations Management
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Journal Article
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RZRengong (Alex) Zhang
Rengong (Alex) Zhang
MHManpreet Hora
Manpreet Hora
SJSarin John
Sarin John
HWHeather A. Wier
Heather A. Wier

16 May 2011 in Contemporary Accounting Research
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Journal Article
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TSThomas W. Scott
Thomas W. Scott
CWChristine I. Wiedman
Christine I. Wiedman
HWHeather A. Wier
Heather A. Wier

1 September 2004 in Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences / Revue Canadienne des Sciences de l'Administration
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Journal Article
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CWChristine I. Wiedman
Christine I. Wiedman
HWHeather A. Wier
Heather A. Wier

1 December 2009 in Contemporary Accounting Research
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Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
HWHeather A. Wier
Heather A. Wier

1 January 1999 in Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CWChristine I. Wiedman
Christine I. Wiedman
HWHeather A. Wier
Heather A. Wier
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards Number 94 (FAS 94) requires that firms consolidate all majority-owned subsidiaries, including those that were previously exempt from consolidation requirements due to the dissimilarity of parent/subsidiary operations. Prior to FAS 94, firms disclosed summary information on unconsolidated subsidiaries in their notes. This research demonstrates that, although the overall sample is unbiased, pre–FAS 94 note disclosures were insufficient to enable users to obtain an accurate picture of consolidated leverage for a number of firms. The research also illustrates that firms that underreported subsidiary debt had significantly higher consolidated leverage (as measured using pre–FAS 94 note disclosures) than other firms and that the market appeared to have relied on these inaccurate disclosures in assessing firm value.