This paper estimates the price elasticity of healthcare utilization in early childhood. We employ a regression discontinuity design by exploiting a subsidy that reduces patient cost-sharing for children under age 3 in Taiwan. Using longitudinal medical claims of over 410,000 children, we find a modest price elasticity of outpatient expenditure (e.g., −0.10 for regular outpatient care). Furthermore, increased cost-sharing at age 3 largely decreases the chance of visiting high-intensity healthcare providers (e.g., teaching hospitals) for minor illnesses. In contrast, children’s utilization of inpatient care is price insensitive, providing a rationale for full inpatient care coverage to children. (JEL H51, I11, I12, I13, I18, J13)
A global budgeting system helps control the growth of healthcare spending by setting expenditure ceilings. However, the hospital global budget implemented in Taiwan in 2002 included a special provision: drug expenditures are reimbursed at face value, while other expenditures are subject to discounting. That gives hospitals, particularly those that are for-profit, an incentive to increase drug expenditures in treating patients. We calculated monthly drug expenditures by hospital departments from January 1997 to June 2006, using a sample of 348 193 patient claims to Taiwan National Health Insurance. To allow for variation among responses by departments with differing reliance on drugs and among hospitals of different ownerships, we used quantile regression to identify the effect of the hospital global budget on drug expenditures. Although drug expenditure increased in all hospital departments after the enactment of the hospital global budget, departments in for-profit hospitals that rely more heavily on drug treatments increased drug spending more, relative to public hospitals. Our findings suggest that a global budgeting system with special reimbursement provisions for certain treatment categories may alter treatment decisions and may undermine cost-containment goals, particularly among for-profit hospitals.
The productivity of firms has been shown to decline after breaks in production. The literature suggests that one cause of this decline is the depreciation of human capital of individual workers. We examine the productivity of cardiac surgeons and hospitals to determine whether the length of or level of task repetition prior to breaks in production affects the productivity of individuals. We find decreases in surgeon productivity that are directly attributable to the length of the break between surgeries, with little evidence that this effect is mitigated by the level of task repetition prior to the break.