We synthesize two related literatures on firm-level drivers of wage inequality. Studies of rent sharing that use matched worker-firm data find elasticities of wages with respect to value added per worker in the range of 0.05–0.15. Studies of wage determination with worker and firm fixed effects typically find that firm-specific premiums explain 20% of overall wage variation. To interpret these findings, we develop a model of wage setting in which workers have idiosyncratic tastes for different workplaces. Simple versions of this model can rationalize standard fixed effects specifications and also match the typical rent-sharing elasticities in the literature.
26 October 2015 in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
There is growing evidence that firm-specific pay premiums are an important source of wage inequality. These premiums will contribute to the gender wage gap if women are less likely to work at high-paying firms or if women negotiate (or are offered) worse wage bargains with their employers than men. Using longitudinal data on the hourly wages of Portuguese workers matched with income statement information for firms, we show that the wages of both men and women contain firm-specific premiums that are strongly correlated with simple measures of the potential bargaining surplus at each firm. We then show how the impact of these firm-specific pay differentials on the gender wage gap can be decomposed into a combination of sorting and bargaining effects. We find that women are less likely to work at firms that pay higher premiums to either gender, with sorting effects being most important for low- and middle-skilled workers. We also find that women receive only 90% of the firm-specific pay premiums earned by men. Importantly, we find the same gender gap in the responses of wages to changes in potential surplus over time. Taken together, the combination of sorting and bargaining effects explain about one-fifth of the cross-sectional gender wage gap in Portugal.
Using a longitudinal dataset covering the period 1987–2000, the authors explore the impact of female employers and gender segregation on wages in Portugal. In the context of Becker's (1957) taste for discrimination theory, they investigate whether the gender of a firm manager affects gender wage differences. They find that females benefit from higher wages in female-led firms than in male-led firms. Further, when females lead, the wage gap between female and male workers is reduced by 1.5%, regardless of the gender composition of the firm's workforce. At the same time, the higher the share of females in a firm, the lower the wages overall for both female and male workers. The authors' results are compatible with the notion that job promotion is an important factor in wage increases. The more females are mentored and promoted, the less men will be. However, as more females in the firm compete for promotion, opportunities for both females and males to be promoted diminish.