Krishnamurty Muralidhar

Krishnamurty Muralidhar

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Krishnamurty Muralidhar

Price College of Business, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

35Years (1992-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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23 December 2022 in ACM Computing Surveys
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
ABAlberto Blanco-Justicia
Alberto Blanco-Justicia
DSDavid Sanchez
David Sanchez
JDJosep Domingo-Ferrer
Josep Domingo-Ferrer
KMKrishnamurty Muralidhar
Krishnamurty Muralidhar
We review the use of differential privacy (DP) for privacy protection in machine learning (ML). We show that, driven by the aim of preserving the accuracy of the learned models, DP-based ML implementations are so loose that they do not offer theex anteprivacy guarantees of DP. Instead, what they deliver is basically noise addition similar to the traditional (and often criticized) statistical disclosure control approach. Due to the lack of formal privacy guarantees, the actual level of privacy offered must be experimentally assessedex post, which is done very seldom. In this respect, we present empirical results showing that standard anti-overfitting techniques in ML can achieve a better utility/privacy/efficiency tradeoff than DP.


22 January 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JDJosep Domingo-Ferrer
Josep Domingo-Ferrer
KMKrishnamurty Muralidhar
Krishnamurty Muralidhar
MBMaria Bras-Amorós
Maria Bras-Amorós

1 September 2023 in Journal of Official Statistics
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Journal Article
Open access
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KMKrishnamurty Muralidhar
Krishnamurty Muralidhar
JDJosep Domingo-Ferrer
Josep Domingo-Ferrer
In recent years, it has been claimed that releasing accurate statistical information on a database is likely to allow its complete reconstruction. Differential privacy has been suggested as the appropriate methodology to prevent these attacks. These claims have recently been taken very seriously by the U.S. Census Bureau and led them to adopt differential privacy for releasing U.S. Census data. This in turn has caused consternation among users of the Census data due to the lack of accuracy of the protected outputs. It has also brought legal action against the U.S. Department of Commerce. In this article, we trace the origins of the claim that releasing information on a database automatically makes it vulnerable to being exposed by reconstruction attacks and we show that this claim is, in fact, incorrect. We also show that reconstruction can be averted by properly using traditional statistical disclosure control (SDC) techniques. We further show that the geographic level at which exact counts are released is even more relevant to protection than the actual SDC method employed. Finally, we caution against confusing reconstruction and reidentification: using the quality of reconstruction as a metric of reidentification results in exaggerated reidentification risk figures.

1 July 1992 in Decision Sciences
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Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
KMKrishnamurty Muralidhar
Krishnamurty Muralidhar
SZStelios H. Zanakis
Stelios H. Zanakis