Laypeople as well as professionals such as business managers and medical doctors often use psychological heuristics. Psychological heuristics are models for making inferences that (1) rely heavily on core human capacities (such as recognition, recall, or imitation); (2) do not necessarily use all available information and process the information they use by simple computations (such as lexicographic rules or aspiration levels); and (3) are easy to understand, apply, and explain. Psychological heuristics are a simple alternative to optimization models (where the optimum of a mathematical function that incorporates all available information is computed). I review studies in business, medicine, and psychology where computer simulations and mathematical analyses reveal conditions under which heuristics make better inferences than optimization and vice versa. The conditions involve concepts that refer to (i) the structure of the problem, (ii) the resources of the decision maker, or (iii) the properties of the models. I discuss open problems in the theoretical study of the concepts. Finally, I organize the current results tentatively in a tree for helping decision analysts decide whether to suggest heuristics or optimization to decision makers. I conclude by arguing for a multimethod, multidisciplinary approach to the theory and practice of inference and decision making.
Heuristics embodying limited information search and noncompensatory processing of information can yield robust performance relative to computationally more complex models. One criticism raised against heuristics is the argument that complexity is hidden in the calculation of the cue order used to make predictions. We discuss ways to order cues that do not entail individual learning. Then we propose and test the thesis that when orders are learned individually, people's necessarily limited knowledge will curtail computational complexity while also achieving robustness. Using computer simulations, we compare the performance of the take-the-best heuristic--with dichotomized or undichotomized cues--to benchmarks such as the naïve Bayes algorithm across 19 environments. Even with minute sizes of training sets, take-the-best using undichotomized cues excels. For 10 environments, we probe people's intuitions about the direction of the correlation between cues and criterion. On the basis of these intuitions, in most of the environments take-the-best achieves the level of performance that would be expected from learning cue orders from 50% of the objects in the environments. Thus, ordinary information about cues--either gleaned from small training sets or intuited--can support robust performance without requiring Herculean computations.
1 October 2006 in Journal of Mathematical Psychology