This article examines the continuity of heteropatriarchal discourse within China’s population policies, focusing on the transition from the one-child policy to the current three-children initiative, and women’s responses to these official narratives. Through the lens of Foucauldian bio-politics, the study explores how discursive practices surrounding family planning policy are manipulated to sustain authoritarian rule, linking it with loyalty to the state and fostering an anti-feminist support base that attributes collective feminist movements to “excessive education.” The “optimization” of the family planning policy is analyzed as a discursive construct that conceals dehumanizing policies reducing women to mere reproductive machines, and portraying children solely as future labor force. This paper argues that the digital feminist movement in China is sustained by women’s constant engagement with, and resistance against official narratives that co-opt feminism to serve the state’s bio-political agenda of managing and controlling the female body.
Patriotic campaigns and mass mobilization draw on existing xenophobic attitudes of the public, reinforcing the ‘us vs. them’ dualism between China and ‘the West’. However, patriotic campaigns are not always top-down, state-led, nor are they always primarily driven by political ideology. Patriotic content appeals to a growing nationalist audience who consumes a mixed feeling of perceived victimization at the hand of foreign aggression and the pride arising from being a Chinese citizen. This paper argues that the profitability of patriotic content circulating on social media exacerbated the tension between market-driven grassroots patriotism and state-led patriotic campaigns. The tension grows out of, and is manifested in, the online popular debate around economically driven, grassroots ‘patriotic’ content that can challenge the state state-led patriotic rhetoric. While the state sometimes strategically co-opts some patriotic contents into its own patriotic narratives, it also delegitimises other undesired ones through labels such as ‘high-level black’ (gaoji hei) or ‘low-level red’ (diji hong). These labels were initially used to differentiate meticulously crafted political satire and parody from incompetent, illogical and vulgar propaganda pieces that unintendedly blemish the state’s patriotic campaigns, but later evolved into an exercise of power to distance the CCP from undesired patriotic content.
How has China’s privacy protection strategy been developed, with its broad scope and stringent requirements for data localization and cross-border data flows? What are the broader geopolitical implications of its divergence from Western models of data privacy? This paper argues that China's privacy protection strategy, characterized by its comprehensive regulatory framework and government access to data, is redefining the contours of global data governance and creating new geopolitical fault lines. Drawing on official documents, laws, regulations, and a case study, this paper highlights the evolution of the regulatory framework in response to emerging challenges posed by technological innovations and the wider geopolitical environment. This paper contributes to the broader discussion regarding the implications of China's privacy protection approach, highlighting potential normative clashes with countries that favor a more open digital economy. China's efforts in developing its own privacy protection strategy have also resulted in the formulation of global standards for data privacy.
In traditional Chinese culture, menstrual blood is considered the dirtiest of all bodily emissions, and its alleged capacity to “contaminate” is believed to be dangerous to those who come into cont...
The fight against terrorism prompts governments to differentiate between “good” religious practices and the “bad” ones. The simplistic dichotomy of “good” and “bad” Muslims has led to a cascade of criticism, but a fallacy underlying this dualism remains underexplored. This paper examines the “no true Scotsman” fallacy that is prevalent in the political discourse surrounding terrorism and religion. It argues that China's attempt to counteract the essentialist assumption about Uyghurs leads to a reinforced “good-versus-bad” dichotomous categorization of Muslims, reflected in the binary of “normal” and “illegal” in China's religious policy. This is a major contribution to the existing literature on politics and religion because, theoretically, this paper applies the “no true Scotsman” fallacy and “good” and “bad” Muslims dichotomy to explain the relationship between politics and religion; empirically, it provides a rich overview of the political nature of religious policy in China.