Elena Veronica Belmega

Elena Veronica Belmega

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Elena Veronica Belmega

Universit Gustave Eiffel, CNRS, LIGM, Marne-la-Valle, France

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

16Years (2011-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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6 July 2021 in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
Subhash LakshminarayanaSubhash Lakshminarayana
Subhash Lakshminarayana
EBE. Veronica Belmega
E. Veronica Belmega
H. Vincent PoorH. Vincent Poor
H. Vincent Poor
This work proposes a moving target defense (MTD) strategy to detect coordinated cyber-physical attacks (CCPAs) against power grids. The main idea of the proposed approach is to invalidate the knowledge that the attackers use to mask the effects of their physical attack by actively perturbing the grid’s transmission line reactances via distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices. The proposed MTD design consists of two parts. First, we identify the subset of links for D-FACTS device deployment that enables the defender to detect CCPAs against any link in the system. Then, in order to minimize the defense cost during the system’s operational time, we formulate a zero-sum game to identify the best subset of links to perturb (which will provide adequate protection) against a strategic attacker. The Nash equilibrium robust solution is computed via exponential weights, which does not require complete knowledge of the game but only the observed payoff at each iteration. Extensive simulations performed using the MATPOWER simulator on IEEE bus systems verify the effectiveness of our approach in detecting CCPAs and reducing the operator’s defense cost.

7 June 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
EBE. Veronica Belmega
E. Veronica Belmega
ACArsenia Chorti
Arsenia Chorti
Jamming attacks represent a critical vulnerability for wireless secret key generation (SKG) systems. In this paper, two counter-jamming approaches are investigated for SKG systems: first, the employment of energy harvesting (EH) at the legitimate nodes to turn part of the jamming power into useful communication power, and, second, the use of channel hopping or power spreading in block fading channels to reduce the impact of jamming. In both cases, the adversarial interaction between the pair of legitimate nodes and the jammer is formulated as a two-player zero-sum game and the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are characterized analytically and in closed form. In particular, in the case of EH receivers, the existence of a critical transmission power for the legitimate nodes allows the full characterization of the game's equilibria and also enables the complete neutralization of the jammer. In the case of channel hopping versus power spreading techniques, it is shown that the jammer's optimal strategy is always power spreading while the legitimate nodes should only use power spreading in the high signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) regime. In the low SIR regime, when avoiding the jammer's interference becomes critical, channel hopping is optimal for the legitimate nodes. Numerical results demonstrate the efficiency of both counter-jamming measures.

5 May 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ICIrched Chafaa
Irched Chafaa
RNRomain Negrel
Romain Negrel
EBE. Veronica Belmega
E. Veronica Belmega
MDMerouane Debbah
Merouane Debbah
mmWave communication requires accurate and continuous beam steering to overcome the severe propagation loss and user mobility. In this paper, we leverage a self-supervised deep learning approach to exploit sub-6 GHz channels and propose a novel method to predict beamforming vectors in the mmWave band for a single access point – user link. This complex channel-beam mapping is learned via data issued from the DeepMIMO dataset. We then compare our proposed method with existing supervised deep learning and classic reinforcement learning methods. Our simulations show that choosing an appropriate beam steering method depends on the target application and is a tradeoff between data rate and computational complexity. We also investigate tuning the size of our neural network depending on the number of transmit and receive antennas at the access point. Finally, we extend our method to the case of multiple links and introduce a federated learning (FL) approach to efficiently predict their mmWave beams by sharing only the weights of the locally trained neural networks (and not the local data). We investigate both synchronous and asynchronous FL methods. Our numerical simulations show the high potential of our approach, especially when the local available data is scarce or imperfect.

19 September 2018 in IEEE Wireless Communications Letters
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
GRGada Rezgui
Gada Rezgui
EBE. Veronica Belmega
E. Veronica Belmega
ACArsenia Chorti
Arsenia Chorti
The use of energy harvesting as a counter-jamming measure is investigated on the premise that part of the harmful interference can be harvested to increase the transmit power. We formulate the strategic interaction between a pair of legitimate nodes and a malicious jammer as a zero-sum game. Our analysis demonstrates that the legitimate nodes are able to neutralize the jammer. However, this policy is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium and hence is sub-optimal. Instead, harvesting the jamming interference can lead to relative gains of up to 95%, on average, in terms of Shannon capacity, when the jamming interference is high.

23 May 2014 in IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LRLuca Rose
Luca Rose
EBE. Veronica Belmega
E. Veronica Belmega
Walid SaadWalid Saad
Walid Saad
MDMerouane Debbah
Merouane Debbah
In this paper, a novel game-theoretic model of the complex interactions between network service providers (NSPs) and users in heterogeneous small-cell networks is investigated. In this game, the NSPs selfishly aim at maximizing their profit while, simultaneously, the users seek to optimize their chosen service's quality-price tradeoff. A Stackelberg formulation in which the NSPs act as leaders and the users as followers is proposed. The users' interactions are modeled as a general nonatomic game. The existence of a Wardrop equilibrium (WE) in the users' game is proven, and its expression as a solution of a fixed-point equation is provided (irrespective of the number of NSPs, services offered, pricing policies, and QoS functions). Moreover, a set of sufficient conditions that ensure the uniqueness of the WE is provided. Notably, the uniqueness of the equilibrium for the particular case of congestion games is shown. An algorithm approximating these equilibria is provided and its convergence to an ε-WE is proven. The existence of Nash equilibria for the leaders' game is shown and illustrated via numerical simulations.

11 April 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
AMAlexandre Marcastel
Alexandre Marcastel
EBElena Veronica Belmega
Elena Veronica Belmega
PMPanayotis Mertikopoulos
Panayotis Mertikopoulos
IFInbar Fijalkow
Inbar Fijalkow
One of the key challenges in Internet of Things (IoT) networks is to connect many different types of autonomous devices while reducing their individual power consumption. This problem is exacerbated by two main factors: first, the fact that these devices operate in and give rise to a highly dynamic and unpredictable environment where existing solutions (e.g., water-filling algorithms) are no longer relevant; and second, the lack of sufficient information at the device end. To address these issues, we propose a regret-based formulation that accounts for arbitrary network dynamics : this allows us to derive an online power control scheme that is provably capable of adapting to such changes, while relying solely on strictly causal feedback . In so doing, we identify an important tradeoff between the amount of feedback available at the transmitter side and the resulting system performance: if the device has access to unbiased gradient observations, the algorithm's regret after $T$ stages is $\mathcal O(T^{-1/2})$ (up to logarithmic factors); on the other hand, if the device only has access to scalar, utility-based information, this decay rate drops to $\mathcal O(T^{-1/4})$ . The above is validated by an extensive suite of numerical simulations in realistic channel conditions, which clearly exhibit the gains of the proposed online approach over traditional water-filling methods.