Ivana Katic

Ivana Katic

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Ivana Katic

Yale School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06520

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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6 December 2022 in Journal of Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
IKIvana V. Katic
Ivana V. Katic
AHAmy Hillman
Amy Hillman
We update the literature on corporate attempts to influence political actors, and thereby shape their governmental outcomes. Doing so allows us to recognize where the field has advanced, where it has not, and, importantly, reimagine an agenda for research moving forward. Our review documents areas of research and levels of analyses within the literature and identifies a core and secondary issues including the overrepresentation of lobbying and campaign contributions, the U.S. context, legislatures as targets of CPA, and firm policy and financial outcomes. We use the review to update the conceptualization of the political marketplace, including the introduction of a new categorization of corporate political activity tactics (CPA) along the dimensions of formality and directness. What we call our political marketplace 2.0 then allows for an expanded agenda for research in the field, moving forward. Our review works together with a companion review on Corporate Political Connections, published in this same issue, to offer a holistic perspective on the boundary between corporations and political actors.

13 April 2017 in Business & Society
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
IKIvana Katic
Ivana Katic
PIPaul Ingram
Paul Ingram
Income inequality is emerging as the socioeconomic topic of our era. Yet there is no clear conclusion as to how income inequality affects the most comprehensive human outcome measure, subjective well-being (SWB). This study provides an explanation for the relationship between income inequality and SWB, by delving into its mechanisms, including egalitarian preferences, perceived fairness, social comparison concerns, as well as perceived social mobility. In a rigorous analysis using a large cross-country dataset, and accounting for the nested structure of the data, as well as controlling for a variety of individual and country characteristics, we find that SWB is higher where income inequality is higher. Importantly, we also find support for this relationship being moderated by perceptions of poverty being caused by unfairness, an individual’s relative socioeconomic standing, as well as beliefs about hard work leading to success. Our study highlights the dire need for further scholarly attention to income inequality and its complex effects on SWB.

1 January 2024 in Organization Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
IKIvana V. Katic
Ivana V. Katic
JKJerry W. Kim
Jerry W. Kim
How does the exchange of employees between regulatory agencies and regulated firms (i.e., the firm-government revolving door) affect firm regulatory outcomes? Existing work has mostly found a positive impact of revolving door hiring on firm outcomes, but it has overlooked potential limitations of this corporate political activity (CPA) tactic. We argue that the advantages firms can gain from hiring former regulators are bound by the timing of revolving door employment relative to the regulatory process. Within the context of agribiotechnology and its main regulator, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, we study regulators who move to in-house and contract lobbying positions (i.e., exit revolving door). We find that firms receive better regulatory outcomes (i.e., faster regulatory approval for new crops) only prior to the regulators’ move to in-house lobbying, consistent with the regulatory capture perspective. Moreover, this revolving door was only valuable in the time period immediately before the mobility event. Additionally, contrary to the belief that former regulators provide firms with expertise and social capital as lobbyists, we find that firms did not gain any advantage after regulators became lobbyists. Taken together, our results suggest that revolving doors can be an effective business political mobilization strategy, albeit one that has limited success in shaping firm government outcomes, much like other types of CPA. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2023.1669 .

1 January 2013 in Academy of Management Proceedings
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
IKIvana Katic
Ivana Katic
JKJerry W. Kim
Jerry W. Kim

9 September 2016 in Advances in Production Engineering & Management
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
Andrea IvaniševićAndrea Ivanišević
Andrea Ivanišević
IKI. Katic
I. Katic
BBBorut Buchmeister
Borut Buchmeister
MLM. Leber
M. Leber

8 January 2026
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
IKIvana V. Katic
Ivana V. Katic