Isaac Fradkin

Isaac Fradkin

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Isaac Fradkin

Department of Psychology

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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6 August 2018 in Nature Human Behaviour
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Journal Article
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SAShir Atzil
Shir Atzil
WGWei Gao
Wei Gao
IFIsaac Fradkin
Isaac Fradkin
LBLisa Feldman Barrett
Lisa Feldman Barrett

1 October 2020 in Psychological Review
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Journal Article
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IFIsaac Fradkin
Isaac Fradkin
RARick A. Adams
Rick A. Adams
Thomas ParrThomas Parr
Thomas Parr
JRJonathan Roiser
Jonathan Roiser
JHJonathan D. Huppert
Jonathan D. Huppert
In this article, we develop a computational model of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). We propose that OCD is characterized by a difficulty in relying on past events to predict the consequences of patients' own actions and the unfolding of possible events. Clinically, this corresponds both to patients' difficulty in trusting their own actions (and therefore repeating them), and to their common preoccupation with unlikely chains of events. Critically, we develop this idea on the basis of the well-developed framework of the Bayesian brain, where this impairment is formalized as excessive uncertainty regarding state transitions. We illustrate the validity of this idea using quantitative simulations and use these to form specific empirical predictions. These predictions are evaluated in relation to existing evidence, and are used to delineate directions for future research. We show how seemingly unrelated findings and phenomena in OCD can be explained by the model, including a persistent experience that actions were not adequately performed and a tendency to repeat actions; excessive information gathering (i.e., checking); indecisiveness and pathological doubt; overreliance on habits at the expense of goal-directed behavior; and overresponsiveness to sensory stimuli, thoughts, and feedback. We discuss the relationship and interaction between our model and other prominent models of OCD, including models focusing on harm-avoidance, not-just-right experiences, or impairments in goal-directed behavior. Finally, we outline potential clinical implications and suggest lines for future research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

1 February 2020 in Clinical Psychology Review
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ASAsher Y. Strauss
Asher Y. Strauss
IFIsaac Fradkin
Isaac Fradkin
RMRichard J. McNally
Richard J. McNally
OLOmer Linkovski
Omer Linkovski
GAGideon Emanuel Anholt
Gideon Emanuel Anholt
JHJonathan D. Huppert
Jonathan D. Huppert

27 February 2020 in PLOS Computational Biology
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IFIsaac Fradkin
Isaac Fradkin
CLCasimir Ludwig
Casimir Ludwig
EEEran Eldar
Eran Eldar
JHJonathan D. Huppert
Jonathan D. Huppert
Obsessive compulsive (OC) symptoms involve excessive information gathering (e.g., checking, reassurance-seeking), and uncertainty about possible, often catastrophic, future events. Here we propose that these phenomena are the result of excessive uncertainty regarding state transitions (transition uncertainty): a computational impairment in Bayesian inference leading to a reduced ability to use the past to predict the present and future, and to oversensitivity to feedback (i.e. prediction errors). Using a computational model of Bayesian learning under uncertainty in a reversal learning task, we investigate the relationship between OC symptoms and transition uncertainty. Individuals high and low in OC symptoms performed a task in which they had to detect shifts (i.e. transitions) in cue-outcome contingencies. Modeling subjects’ choices was used to estimate each individual participant’s transition uncertainty and associated responses to feedback. We examined both an optimal observer model and an approximate Bayesian model in which participants were assumed to attend (and learn about) only one of several cues on each trial. Results suggested the participants were more likely to distribute attention across cues, in accordance with the optimal observer model. As hypothesized, participants with higher OC symptoms exhibited increased transition uncertainty, as well as a pattern of behavior potentially indicative of a difficulty in relying on learned contingencies, with no evidence for perseverative behavior. Increased transition uncertainty compromised these individuals' ability to predict ensuing feedback, rendering them more surprised by expected outcomes. However, no evidence for excessive belief updating was found. These results highlight a potential computational basis for OC symptoms and obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD). The fact the OC symptoms predicted a decreased reliance on the past rather than perseveration challenges preconceptions of OCD as a disorder of inflexibility. Our results have implications for the understanding of the neurocognitive processes leading to excessive uncertainty and distrust of past experiences in OCD. Obsessive compulsive (OC) symptoms involve excessive information gathering (e.g., checking, reassurance seeking), and excessive uncertainty about possible future events. Normally, people can use prior experience to predict present and future events. Here we suggest that OC symptoms can be traced back to an impairment in this prediction mechanism. In Bayesian models of learning and decision making the relative weight given to prior experience depends on the estimation of uncertainty. Particularly, when one believes that past states cannot predict the future with certainty, the optimal behavior is to assign a higher weight to current feedback at the expense of prior experience. We examined this mechanism, using a task that required participants to learn cue-outcome contingencies from feedback, while considering the possibility that occasional changes in the contingencies render past experience irrelevant. A computational analysis of participants' behavior showed that participants with higher OC symptoms indeed assigned lower weight to prior experience, leading to over-exploratory behavior. These results have implications for the understanding of the neurocognitive processes leading to excessive uncertainty and distrust of past experiences in obsessive compulsive disorder.

23 March 2018 in Clinical Psychological Science
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IFIsaac Fradkin
Isaac Fradkin
ASAsher Y. Strauss
Asher Y. Strauss
MPMaayan Pereg
Maayan Pereg
JHJonathan D. Huppert
Jonathan D. Huppert
Several recent models of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) consider it to be a neurocognitive disorder involving inflexibility and disinhibition. Indeed, previous reviews of neuropsychological functioning in OCD suggested impaired performance in flexibility tasks. The current meta-analysis examines whether the reported differences in flexibility can be explained by general underperformance unrelated to flexibility. In addition, the role of feedback processing in inflexibility is investigated. To this end, we integrated evidence from 75 studies that compared patients with OCD with nonpsychiatric controls on at least one flexibility measure, while applying a novel approach in which task scores measuring flexibility were compared with control scores from the same tasks measuring other confounding processes. The results revealed no evidence for inflexibility in OCD, with patients’ performance most parsimoniously explained by nonspecific factors. These results challenge models stressing inflexibility as an endophenotype of OCD. Methodological implications for reviewing cognitive deficits in psychopathology are discussed.

15 October 2018 in Clinical Psychological Science
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Journal Article
Closed access
IFIsaac Fradkin
Isaac Fradkin
BEBaruch Eitam
Baruch Eitam
ASAsher Y. Strauss
Asher Y. Strauss
JHJonathan D. Huppert
Jonathan D. Huppert
Obsessions are commonly described as intrusive, ego-dystonic, and coming out of nowhere. This might reflect an experience of a low sense of agency (SoA; i.e., the experience of being the source of one’s own thoughts). In this study, we investigated the relationship between obsessive-compulsive (OC) symptoms and the SoA over thoughts. Participants were told that subliminal auditory primes (actually sham) can insert thoughts into their minds, and their experiences of inserted thoughts were collected online. The results of three experiments showed reduced SoA over thoughts in individuals with subclinical OC symptoms, regardless of the valence of the thoughts. Several potential confounding factors (e.g., suppression, vigilance, general anxiety) were ruled out. The experience of inserted thoughts was related to experiencing thoughts as “out of context,” which partially explained reduced SoA in participants with high levels of OC symptoms. These experiments highlight the importance of focusing on the low-level, contextual, and phenomenological characteristics of intrusive thoughts in addition to their content and appraisals.