Sebastian Kappes

Sebastian Kappes

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Sebastian Kappes

Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarbrücken, Germany

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

2Years (2025-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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3 September 2025 in Proceedings of the ACM on Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
HTHammas Bin Tanveer
Hammas Bin Tanveer
ECEcho Chan
Echo Chan
RMRicky K. P. Mok
Ricky K. P. Mok
SKSebastian Kappes
Sebastian Kappes
PRPhilipp Richter
Philipp Richter
KCKc Claffy
Kc Claffy
We introduce new tools and vantage points to develop and integrate proactive techniques to attract IPv6 scan traffic, thus enabling its analysis. By deploying the largest-ever IPv6 proactive telescope in a production ISP network, we collected over 600M packets of unsolicited traffic from 1.9k Autonomous Systems in 10 months. We characterized the sources of unsolicited traffic, evaluated the effectiveness of five major features across the network stack, and inferred scanners' sources of target addresses and their strategies.

11 August 2026
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
THTiago Heinrich
Tiago Heinrich
SKSebastian Kappes
Sebastian Kappes
RORafael Rodrigues Obelheiro
Rafael Rodrigues Obelheiro
While DRDoS attacks are well-understood in IPv4, it is not known to what extend attackers also make use of services on the IPv6 Internet to perform DRDoS attacks. In this work, we adapted an IPv4-only DRDoS honeypot to observe DRDoS attacks in IPv6. To attract scanners, we publicized our honeypots' addresses on the TUM IPv6 Hitlist. After one year of data collection, however, we observed little to no attackers exploiting IPv6 UDP services for DRDoS attacks. This paper presents our setup, findings, and the lessons learned from trying attract scanners to our DRDoS honeypot: we analyze the interactions we observed over time as well as the source addresses of scanners, and discuss how our choice of the IPv6 Hitlist as an address exposure method possibly impacted our findings. Although we managed to attract several scanners also observed by previous work, our results show that there are currently no attackers performing DRDoS attacks in IPv6, at least among these that rely on the IPv6 Hitlist to discover vulnerable hots.

12 October 2026
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SKSebastian Kappes
Sebastian Kappes
AFAnja Feldmann
Anja Feldmann
TFTobias Fiebig
Tobias Fiebig
JZJohannes Zirngibl
Johannes Zirngibl


2 September 2026 in Proceedings of the ACM on Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SKSebastian Kappes
Sebastian Kappes
LSLion Steger
Lion Steger
VPVictor Le Pochat
Victor Le Pochat
OGOliver Gasser
Oliver Gasser
JZJohannes Zirngibl
Johannes Zirngibl
THTiago Heinrich
Tiago Heinrich
IPv6's vast address space makes scanning particularly challenging. IPv6 scanners must first discover in-use IPv6 addresses they can target and scan. One way of doing this is by collecting IPv6 addresses from domain names : if a DNS name resolves to an IPv6 address, that address is more likely to be used by an actual live host. In this study, we investigate how IPv6 scanners rely on domain names for target reconnaissance. We set up a large IPv6 telescope to which we attract scanners by placing honey domain names on TLD zone files, CT logs, and the Tranco Top 1M. We introduce a technique to trace the packets that IPv6 scanners send to the telescope back to the initial DNS queries they sent to discover the IPv6 addresses, allowing us to better evaluate how large-scale IPv6 scanners collect and scan addresses. Over a period of six months, we collect 9.4M IPv6 scan packets from 25k addresses in 613 ASes. We find that domain-based IPv6 scanners differ in their address collection strategies, which also correlates with different scanner behavior: scanners that scan addresses hours after collecting them send mostly ICMP traffic, while scanners that resolve domains and scan addresses in one go are more focused on TCP/UDP-many of the latter are also not limited to IPv6 and will fall back to IPv4 if necessary. We uncover that scanners often combine (in particular, open) domain sources to find more targets, and that different domain sources attract different scanners. We also demonstrate that the IPv6 Hitlist is a strong mediating factor when attracting scanners through domain names, which we address by excluding our telescope's address space from the Hitlist. Furthermore, we use our fine-grained packet tracing to detect distributed scanning campaigns involving multiple ASes and to distinguish different scanners within large cloud ASes. Our findings show a diverse landscape of domain-based IPv6 scanning on the Internet: different scanners employ distinct scanning strategies and rely on unique domain sources, which greatly impacts how researchers should study them.