Anouck Girard

Anouck Girard

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Anouck Girard

University of Michigan

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

20Years (2007-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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6 October 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
NLNan Li
Nan Li
YYYu Yao
Yu Yao
IKIlya Kolmanovsky
Ilya Kolmanovsky
EAElla Atkins
Ella Atkins
AGAnouck R. Girard
Anouck R. Girard

17 November 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RTRan Tian
Ran Tian
NLNan Li
Nan Li
IKIlya Kolmanovsky
Ilya Kolmanovsky
YYYildiray Yildiz
Yildiray Yildiz
AGAnouck R. Girard
Anouck R. Girard
For a foreseeable future, autonomous vehicles (AVs) will operate in traffic together with human-driven vehicles. Their planning and control systems need extensive testing, including early-stage testing in simulations where the interactions among autonomous/human-driven vehicles are represented. Motivated by the need for such simulation tools, we propose a game-theoretic approach to modeling vehicle interactions, in particular, for urban traffic environments with unsignalized intersections. We develop traffic models with heterogeneous (in terms of their driving styles) and interactive vehicles based on our proposed approach, and use them for virtual testing, evaluation, and calibration of AV control systems. For illustration, we consider two AV control approaches, analyze their characteristics and performance based on the simulation results with our developed traffic models, and optimize the parameters of one of them.

2 November 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KLKaiwen Liu
Kaiwen Liu
NLNan Li
Nan Li
HTH. Eric Tseng
H. Eric Tseng
IKIlya Kolmanovsky
Ilya Kolmanovsky
AGAnouck Girard
Anouck Girard
Merging is, in general, a challenging task for both human drivers and autonomous vehicles, especially in dense traffic, because the merging vehicle typically needs to interact with other vehicles to identify or create a gap and safely merge into. In this paper, we consider the problem of autonomous vehicle control for forced merge scenarios. We propose a novel game-theoretic controller, called the Leader-Follower Game Controller (LFGC), in which the interactions between the autonomous ego vehicle and other vehicles with a priori uncertain driving intentions is modeled as a partially observable leader-follower game. The LFGC estimates the other vehicles’ intentions online based on observed trajectories, and then predicts their future trajectories and plans the ego vehicle’s own trajectory using Model Predictive Control (MPC) to simultaneously achieve probabilistically guaranteed safety and merging objectives. To verify the performance of LFGC, we test it in simulations and with the NGSIM data, where the LFGC demonstrates a high success rate of $97.5\%$ in merging.

12 April 2023 in IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MLMushuang Liu
Mushuang Liu
IKIlya Kolmanovsky
Ilya Kolmanovsky
HTH. Eric Tseng
H. Eric Tseng
SHSuzhou Huang
Suzhou Huang
DFDimitar Filev
Dimitar Filev
AGAnouck Girard
Anouck Girard
Decision-making for autonomous driving is challenging, considering the complex interactions among multiple traffic agents (including autonomous vehicles (AVs), human-driven vehicles, and pedestrians) and the computational load needed to evaluate these interactions. This paper develops two general potential game-based frameworks, namely, finite and continuous potential games, for decision-making in autonomous driving. The two frameworks account for the AVs’ two types of action spaces, i.e., finite and continuous action spaces, respectively. The developed frameworks provide theoretical guarantees for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria and for the convergence of the Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking algorithms. The scalability challenge is also addressed. In addition, we provide cost function shaping approaches such that the agents’ cost functions not only reflect common driving objectives but also yield potential games. The performance of the developed algorithms is demonstrated in diverse traffic scenarios, including intersection-crossing and lane-changing scenarios. Statistical comparative studies, including 1) finite potential game vs. continuous potential game, 2) best response dynamics vs. potential function optimization, and 3) potential game vs. reinforcement learning (RL) vs. control barrier function (CBF), are conducted to compare the robustness against various surrounding vehicles’ strategies and to compare the computational efficiency. It is shown that the developed potential game frameworks have better robustness than RL and than CBF if the surrounding vehicles are not safety-conscious, and are computationally feasible for real-time implementation.

1 July 2020 in Acta Astronautica
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ETEhsan Taheri
Ehsan Taheri
JJJohn L. Junkins
John L. Junkins
IKIlya Kolmanovsky
Ilya Kolmanovsky
AGAnouck Girard
Anouck Girard

13 January 2015 in Sensors
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JFJonathan Las Fargeas
Jonathan Las Fargeas
PKPierre Kabamba
Pierre Kabamba
AGAnouck Girard
Anouck Girard
This paper considers the problem of path planning for a team of unmanned aerial vehicles performing surveillance near a friendly base. The unmanned aerial vehicles do not possess sensors with automated target recognition capability and, thus, rely on communicating with unattended ground sensors placed on roads to detect and image potential intruders. The problem is motivated by persistent intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and base defense missions. The problem is formulated and shown to be intractable. A heuristic algorithm to coordinate the unmanned aerial vehicles during surveillance and pursuit is presented. Revisit deadlines are used to schedule the vehicles’ paths nominally. The algorithm uses detections from the sensors to predict intruders’ locations and selects the vehicles’ paths by minimizing a linear combination of missed deadlines and the probability of not intercepting intruders. An analysis of the algorithm’s completeness and complexity is then provided. The effectiveness of the heuristic is illustrated through simulations in a variety of scenarios.