Yu Yu

Yu Yu

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Yu Yu

Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

12Years (2015-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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6 May 2021 in npj Quantum Information
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
LWLiu-Jun Wang
Liu-Jun Wang
KZKai-Yi Zhang
Kai-Yi Zhang
JWJia-Yong Wang
Jia-Yong Wang
JCJie Cheng
Jie Cheng
YYYong-Hua Yang
Yong-Hua Yang
JPJian-Wei Pan
Jian-Wei Pan
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can provide information theoretically secure key exchange even in the era of quantum computers. However, QKD requires the classical channel to be authenticated, the current method for which is pre-sharing symmetric keys. For a QKD network ofnusers, this method requires $${C}_{n}^{2}=n(n-1)/2$$Cn2=n(n−1)/2 pairs of symmetric keys to realize pairwise interconnection. In contrast, with the help of a mature public key infrastructure (PKI) and post-quantum cryptography (PQC) with quantum-resistant security, each user only needs to apply for one digital certificate from a certificate authority (CA) to achieve efficient and secure authentication for QKD. We need to assume only the short-term security of the PQC algorithm to achieve long-term security of the distributed keys. Here, we experimentally verified the feasibility, efficiency, and stability of the PQC algorithm in QKD authentication, and demonstrated the advantages when new users join the QKD network. Using the PQC public-key infrastructure, the nodes need to mutually trust only the CA to authenticate each other. QKD combined with PQC authentication will greatly promote and extend the application prospects of quantum-safe communication.

1 January 2015
Verified
Book Chapter
Open access
PDF file
JLJunrong Liu
Junrong Liu
YYYu Yu
Yu Yu
FSFrançois-Xavier Standaert
François-Xavier Standaert
ZGZheng Guo
Zheng Guo
DGDawu Gu
Dawu Gu
XXXinjun Xie
Xinjun Xie
Side-channel attacks are an increasingly important concern for the security of cryptographic embedded devices, such as the SIM cards used in mobile phones. Previous works have exhibited such attacks against implementations of the 2G GSM algorithms (COMP-128, A5). In this paper, we show that they remain an important issue for USIM cards implementing the AES-based MILENAGE algorithm used in 3G/4G communications. In particular, we analyze instances of cards from a variety of operators and manufacturers, and describe successful Differential Power Analysis attacks that recover encryption keys and other secrets (needed to clone the USIM cards) within a few minutes. Further, we discuss the impact of the operator-defined secret parameters in MILENAGE on the difficulty to perform Differential Power Analysis, and show that they do not improve implementation security. Our results back up the observation that physical security issues raise long-term challenges that should be solved early in the development of cryptographic implementations, with adequate countermeasures.




29 December 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
WWWeijia Wang
Weijia Wang
YYYu Yu
Yu Yu
FSFrancois-Xavier Standaert
Francois-Xavier Standaert
JLJunrong Liu
Junrong Liu
ZGZheng Guo
Zheng Guo
DGDawu Gu
Dawu Gu
Differential power analysis (DPA), as a very practical type of side-channel attacks, has been widely studied and used for the security analysis of cryptographic implementations. However, as the development of the chip industry leads to smaller technologies, the leakage of cryptographic implementations in nanoscale devices tends to be nonlinear (i.e., leakages of intermediate bits are no longer independent) and unpredictable. These phenomena make some existing side-channel attacks not perfectly suitable, i.e., decreasing their performance and making some common used prior power models (e.g., Hamming weight) to be much less respected in practice. To solve the above issues, we introduce the regularization process from statistical learning to the area of side-channel attack and propose the ridge-based DPA. We also apply the cross-validation technique to search for the most suitable value of the parameter for our new attack methods. In addition, we present theoretical analyses to deeply investigate the properties of ridge-based DPA for nonlinear leakages. We evaluate the performance of ridge-based DPA in both simulation-based and practical experiments, comparing to the state-to-the-art DPAs. The results confirm the theoretical analysis. Further, our experiments show the robustness of ridge-based DPA to cope with the difference between the leakages of profiling and exploitation power traces. Therefore, by showing a good adaptability to the leakage of the nanoscale chips, the ridge-based DPA is a good alternative to the state-to-the-art ones.