1 October 2021 in Management Science
We offer a new network perspective on one of the central topics in operations management—the bullwhip effect (BWE). The topic has both practical and scholarly implications. We start with an observation: the variability of orders placed to suppliers is larger than the variability of sales to customers for most firms, yet the aggregate demand variability felt by suppliers upstream does not amplify commensurably. We hypothesize that changes to the supplier’s customer base can smooth out its aggregate demand. We test the hypothesis with a data set that tracks the evolution of supply relationships over time. We show that the effect of customer base management extends beyond the statistical benefits of aggregation. In particular, both the formation and the dissolution of customer-supplier relationships are associated with the smoothing of the aggregate demand experienced by suppliers. This provides fresh insight into how firms may leverage their customer-supplier relationships to mitigate the impact of the BWE. This paper was accepted by Jay Swaminathan, operations management.
1 March 2015 in Production and Operations Management
1 January 2022 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Problem definition: Operational disruptions can impact a firm’s risk, which manifests in a host of operational issues, including a higher holding cost for inventory, a higher financing cost for capacity expansion, and a higher perception of the firm’s risk among its supply chain partners. Academic/practical relevance: Although disruptions have been studied extensively in the operations management literature, the emphasis has been on mitigating the deleterious impact on the firm’s production potential rather than its risk. We examine whether implementing and credibly attesting to having effective internal control systems will meaningfully influence the impact of operational disruptions on the firm’s risk and market valuation. Methodology: We exploit a 2004 regulatory change that required certain firms to attest to having control systems in place. Our triple-difference regression specification takes advantage of a regulatory anomaly that excluded a well-defined set of firms from complying with the control system requirement. Results: We find that firms that were obligated to comply with this regulatory requirement experienced a materially smaller increase in their risk and a smaller decrease in their market value in the aftermath of an operational disruption. Firms that were not obligated to comply with this requirement did not experience such benefits in the aftermath of a disruption and instead, experienced a larger increase in their risk. Managerial implications: Fostering a better understanding of whether credible control systems can reduce the impact of disruptions on the firm’s risk and value is important as it identifies a broader set of mitigation strategies available to operations managers. This can help managers achieve a better fit between their risk mitigation initiatives and their objectives and budget constraints.
25 March 2021 in Production and Operations Management
1 June 2024 in Strategy Science
Platform governance helps align the activities of participating actors to deliver value within the platforms. These platforms can operate in environments where governance is intentionally or conventionally weak in favor of open access, frictionless transactions, or free speech. Such low- or no-governance environments leave room for illegitimate actors to penetrate platforms with illegitimate content or transactions. We propose that an external observer can employ transparency mechanisms to establish “soft” governance that allows participants in a low-governance environment to distinguish between sources of legitimate and illegitimate content. We examine how this might work in the context of disinformation Internet domains by training a machine learning classifier to discern between low-legitimacy from high-legitimacy content providers based on website registration data. The results suggest that an independent observer can employ such a classifier to provide an early, although imperfect, signal of whether a website is intended to host illegitimate content. We show that the independent observer can be effective at serving multiple platforms by providing intermediate prediction results that platforms can align with their unique governance priorities. We expand our analysis with a signaling game model to ascertain whether such a soft governance structure can be resilient to adversarial responses.Funding: Funding for this research was provided by UCL School of Management and Emory University.Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2023.0006 .
28 April 2015 in Decision Sciences