Giles W. Story

Giles W. Story

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Giles W. Story

Division of Psychiatry, University College London

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

12Years (2015-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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13 January 2016 in Frontiers in Psychology
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Journal Article
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GSGiles W. Story
Giles W. Story
MMMichael Moutoussis
Michael Moutoussis
RDRaymond J. Dolan
Raymond J. Dolan
Impatience for reward is a facet of many psychiatric disorders. We draw attention to a growing literature finding greater discounting of delayed reward, an important aspect of impatience, across a range of psychiatric disorders. We propose these findings are best understood by considering the goals and motivation for discounting future reward. We characterise these as arising from either the opportunity costs of waiting or the uncertainty associated with delayed reward. We link specific instances of higher discounting in psychiatric disorder to heightened subjective estimates of either of these factors. We propose these costs are learned and represented based either on a flexible cognitive model of the world, or an accumulation of previous experience, or through evolutionary specification. Any of these can be considered suboptimal for the individual if the resulting behaviour results in impairments in personal and social functioning and/or in distress. By considering the neurochemical and neuroanatomical implementation of these processes, we illustrate how this approach can in principle unite social, psychological and biological conceptions of impulsive choice.

1 April 2024 in Psychological Review
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Journal Article
Open access
GSGiles W. Story
Giles W. Story
RSRyan Smith
Ryan Smith
MMMichael Moutoussis
Michael Moutoussis
IBIsabel M. Berwian
Isabel M. Berwian
TNTobias Nolte
Tobias Nolte
RDRaymond J. Dolan
Raymond J. Dolan
People often form polarized beliefs, imbuing objects (e.g., themselves or others) with unambiguously positive or negative qualities. In clinical settings, this is referred to as dichotomous thinking or "splitting" and is a feature of several psychiatric disorders. Here, we introduce a Bayesian model of splitting that parameterizes a tendency to rigidly categorize objects as either entirely "Bad" or "Good," rather than to flexibly learn dispositions along a continuous scale. Distinct from the previous descriptive theories, the model makes quantitative predictions about how dichotomous beliefs emerge and are updated in light of new information. Specifically, the model addresses how splitting is context-dependent, yet exhibits stability across time. A key model feature is that phases of devaluation and/or idealization are consolidated by rationally attributing counter-evidence to external factors. For example, when another person is idealized, their less-than-perfect behavior is attributed to unfavorable external circumstances. However, sufficient counter-evidence can trigger switches of polarity, producing bistable dynamics. We show that the model can be fitted to empirical data, to measure individual susceptibility to relational instability. For example, we find that a latent categorical belief that others are "Good" accounts for less changeable, and more certain, character impressions of benevolent as opposed to malevolent others among healthy participants. By comparison, character impressions made by participants with borderline personality disorder reveal significantly higher and more symmetric splitting. The generative framework proposed invites applications for modeling oscillatory relational and affective dynamics in psychotherapeutic contexts. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

30 October 2015 in Scientific Reports
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Journal Article
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GSGiles W. Story
Giles W. Story
IVIvo Vlaev
Ivo Vlaev
RMRobert D. Metcalfe
Robert D. Metcalfe
MCMolly J. Crockett
Molly J. Crockett
ZKZeb Kurth-Nelson
Zeb Kurth-Nelson
RDRaymond J. Dolan
Raymond J. Dolan
People show empathic responses to others’ pain, yet how they choose to apportion pain between themselves and others is not well understood. To address this question, we observed choices to reapportion social allocations of painful stimuli and, for comparison, also elicited equivalent choices with money. On average people sought to equalize allocations of both pain and money, in a manner which indicated that inequality carried an increasing marginal cost. Preferences for pain were more altruistic than for money, with several participants assigning more than half the pain to themselves. Our data indicate that, given concern for others, the fundamental principle of diminishing marginal utility motivates spreading costs across individuals. A model incorporating this assumption outperformed existing models of social utility in explaining the data. By implementing selected allocations for real, we also found that while inequality per se did not influence pain perception, altruistic behavior had an intrinsic analgesic effect for the recipient.

7 October 2020 in Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior
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Journal Article
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GSGiles W. Story
Giles W. Story
ZKZeb Kurth‐Nelson
Zeb Kurth‐Nelson
MCMolly Crockett
Molly Crockett
IVIvo Vlaev
Ivo Vlaev
ADAra Darzi
Ara Darzi
RDRaymond J. Dolan
Raymond J. Dolan
Impatience can be formalized as a delay discount rate, describing how the subjective value of reward decreases as it is delayed. By analogy, selfishness can be formalized as a social discount rate, representing how the subjective value of rewarding another person decreases with increasing social distance. Delay and social discount rates for reward are correlated across individuals. However no previous work has examined whether this relationship also holds for aversive outcomes. Neither has previous work described a functional form for social discounting of pain in humans. This is a pertinent question, since preferences over aversive outcomes formally diverge from those for reward. We addressed this issue in an experiment in which healthy adult participants (N = 67) chose the timing and intensity of hypothetical pain for themselves and others. In keeping with previous studies, participants showed a strong preference for immediate over delayed pain. Participants showed greater concern for pain in close others than for their own pain, though this hyperaltruism was steeply discounted with increasing social distance. Impatience for pain and social discounting of pain were weakly correlated across individuals. Our results extend a link between impatience and selfishness to the aversive domain.

19 November 2024 in Translational Psychiatry
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Journal Article
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GSGiles W. Story
Giles W. Story
SESam Ereira
Sam Ereira
SVStephanie Valle
Stephanie Valle
SCSamuel R. Chamberlain
Samuel R. Chamberlain
JGJon E. Grant
Jon E. Grant
RDRaymond J. Dolan
Raymond J. Dolan
A tendency to merge mental representations of self and other is thought to underpin the intense and unstable relationships that feature in Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). However, clinical theories of BPD do not specify, in computational terms, how the perspectives of self and other might become confused. To address this question, we used a probabilistic false belief task (p-FBT) to examine how individuals with BPD (N = 38) and matched controls from the general population (N = 74) selectively assigned beliefs to self or other. The p-FBT requires participants to track a gradually changing quantity, whilst also predicting another person’s belief about that quantity. We found that BPD participants showed less selectivity in belief assignment compared with controls (Cohen’s d = 0.64). Behaviourally, participants with BPD tended to predict that others’ beliefs resembled their own. Modelling analysis revealed that BPD participants were prone to generalise their own learning signals to others. Furthermore, this generalising tendency correlated with BPD symptomatology across participants, even when controlling for demographic factors and affective psychopathology. Our results support a computational account of self-other mergence, based on a generalisation of learning across agents. Self-other generalisation in learning purports to explain key clinical features of BPD, and suggests a potential transdiagnostic marker of mentalising capability.

1 April 2024 in Decision
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
GSG. W. Story
G. W. Story
ZKZ. Kurth-Nelson
Z. Kurth-Nelson
MMM. Moutoussis
M. Moutoussis
KIK. Iigaya
K. Iigaya
GWG. -J. Will
G. -J. Will
RDR. J. Dolan
R. J. Dolan
Humans discount delayed relative to more immediate reward. A plausible explanation is that impatience arises partly from uncertainty, or risk, implicit in delayed reward. Existing theories of discounting-as-risk focus on a probability that delayed reward will not materialize. By contrast, we examine how uncertainty in the magnitude of delayed reward contributes to delay discounting. We propose a model wherein reward is discounted proportional to the rate of random change in its magnitude across time, termed volatility. We find evidence to support this model across three experiments (total N = 158). First, using a task where participants chose when to sell products, whose price dynamics they previously learned, we show discounting increases in line with price volatility. Second, we show that this effect pertains over naturalistic delays of up to 4 months. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we observe a volatility-dependent decrease in functional hippocampal–prefrontal coupling during intertemporal choice. Third, we replicate these effects in a larger online sample, finding that volatility discounting within each task correlates with baseline discounting outside of the task. We conclude that delay discounting partly reflects time-dependent uncertainty about reward magnitude, that is volatility. Our model captures how discounting adapts to volatility, thereby partly accounting for individual differences in impatience. Our imaging findings suggest a putative mechanism whereby uncertainty reduces prospective simulation of future outcomes.