Giovane C. M. Moura

Giovane C. M. Moura

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Giovane C. M. Moura

SIDN Labs and Delft University of Technology, Arnhem and Delft, Netherlands

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
30 March 2021
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
GMGiovane C. M. Moura
Giovane C. M. Moura
MMMoritz Müller
Moritz Müller
MDMarco Davids
Marco Davids
MWMaarten Wullink
Maarten Wullink
CHCristian Hesselman
Cristian Hesselman

2 December 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
GMGiovane C. M. Moura
Giovane C. M. Moura
TDThomas Daniels
Thomas Daniels
MBMaarten Bosteels
Maarten Bosteels
SCSebastian Castro
Sebastian Castro
MMMoritz Müller
Moritz Müller
GSGeorgios Smaragdakis
Georgios Smaragdakis
Phishing on the web is a model of social engineering and an attack vector for getting access to sensitive and financial data of individuals and corporations. Phishing has been identified as one of the prime cyber threats in recent years. With the goal to effectively identify and mitigate phishing as early as possible, we present in this paper a longitudinal analysis of phishing attacks from the vantage point of three country-code top-level domain (ccTLD) registries that manage more than 8 million active domains -- namely the Netherlands' .nl, Ireland's .ie, and Belgium's .be. We perform a longitudinal analysis on phishing attacks spanning up to 10 years, based on more than 28 thousand phishing domains. Our results show two major attack strategies: national companies and organizations are far more often impersonated using malicious registered domains under their country's own ccTLD, which enables better mimicry of the impersonated company. In stark contrast, international companies are impersonated using any domains that can be compromised, reducing overall mimicry but bearing no registration and financial costs. Although most research works focus on detecting new domain names, we show that 80% of phishing attacks in the studied ccTLDs employ compromised domain names. We find banks, financial institutions, and high-tech giant companies at the top of the most impersonated targets. We also show the impact of ccTLDs' registration and abuse handling policies on preventing and mitigating phishing attacks, and that mitigation is complex and performed at both web and DNS level at different intermediaries. Last, our results provide a unique opportunity for ccTLDs to compare and revisit their policies and impacts, with the goal of improving mitigation procedures.

22 March 2022
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
GMGiovane C. M. Moura
Giovane C. M. Moura
JHJohn Heidemann
John Heidemann
WHWes Hardaker
Wes Hardaker
PCPithayuth Charnsethikul
Pithayuth Charnsethikul
JBJeroen Bulten
Jeroen Bulten
CHCristian Hesselman
Cristian Hesselman

16 February 2024 in Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
GMGiovane C. M. Moura
Giovane C. M. Moura
MDMarco Davids
Marco Davids
CSCaspar Schutijser
Caspar Schutijser
CHCristian Hesselman
Cristian Hesselman
JHJohn Heidemann
John Heidemann
GSGeorgios Smaragdakis
Georgios Smaragdakis
Time synchronization is of paramount importance on the Internet, with the Network Time Protocol (NTP) serving as the primary synchronization protocol. The NTP Pool, a volunteer-driven initiative launched two decades ago, facilitates connections between clients and NTP servers. Our analysis of root DNS queries reveals that the NTP Pool has consistently been the most popular time service. We further investigate the DNS component (GeoDNS) of the NTP Pool, which is responsible for mapping clients to servers. Our findings indicate that the current algorithm is heavily skewed, leading to the emergence of time monopolies for entire countries. For instance, clients in the US are served by 551 NTP servers, while clients in Cameroon and Nigeria are served by only one and two servers, respectively, out of the 4k+ servers available in the NTP Pool. We examine the underlying assumption behind GeoDNS for these mappings and discover that time servers located far away can still provide accurate clock time information to clients. We have shared our findings with the NTP Pool operators, who acknowledge them and plan to revise their algorithm to enhance security.

10 June 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
GMGiovane C. M. Moura
Giovane C. M. Moura
MDMarco Davids
Marco Davids
CSCaspar Schutijser
Caspar Schutijser
CHCristian Hesselman
Cristian Hesselman
JHJohn Heidemann
John Heidemann
GSGeorgios Smaragdakis
Georgios Smaragdakis
Time synchronization is of paramount importance on the Internet, with the Network Time Protocol (NTP) serving as the primary synchronization protocol. The NTP Pool, a volunteer-driven initiative launched two decades ago, facilitates connections between clients and NTP servers. Our analysis of root DNS queries reveals that the NTP Pool has consistently been the most popular time service. We further investigate the DNS component (GeoDNS) of the NTP Pool, which is responsible for mapping clients to servers. Our findings indicate that the current algorithm is heavily skewed, leading to the emergence of time monopolies for entire countries. For instance, clients in the US are served by 551 NTP servers, while clients in Cameroon and Nigeria are served by only one and two servers, respectively, out of the 4k+ servers available in the NTP Pool. We examine the underlying assumption behind GeoDNS for these mappings and discover that time servers located far away can still provide accurate clock time information to clients. We have shared our findings with the NTP Pool operators, who acknowledge them and plan to revise their algorithm to enhance security.

19 November 2026 in Proceedings of the ACM on Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PHPascal Huppert
Pascal Huppert
GMGiovane C. M. Moura
Giovane C. M. Moura
MDMarco Davids
Marco Davids
PBPieter-Tjerk de Boer
Pieter-Tjerk de Boer
RHRalph Holz
Ralph Holz
CHCristian Hesselman
Cristian Hesselman
The Network Time Protocol (NTP) keeps Internet-connected clocks synchronized, which core applications and protocols depend on for proper functioning, including DNS caches, RPKI, and TLS. Next to free time servers (NIST, NTP Pool), large cloud providers and OS vendors such as Microsoft, Apple, and Google have begun operating their own time services and setting their billions of systems/devices to use their NTP servers by default. This creates a level of service centralization around these providers, and yet there has been little scrutiny of these services and their characteristics. In this paper, we characterize seven large time service providers in terms of replication architecture, client mapping, accuracy and service provided. We found a large variation in service replication (DNS and anycast), how they map clients to servers, and in their accuracy and (security) feature support. This includes violations of best practices, servers clocks being incorrect by up to 50ms on one occasion, the use of outdated NTP versions, and a lack of support for NTS, RPKI, and DNSSEC.