SYNOPSIS: The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) Auditing Standard (AS) 3101 requires auditor’s reports to include the communication of critical audit matters (CAMs). This study investigates the recurrence of CAM topics following the standard’s implementation to determine which CAM topics could be considered recurring, nonrecurring, and intermittent. We provide descriptive evidence that the average number of CAMs reported by auditors decreased over the first three years and then show occurrence patterns for CAM topics during our sample period (June 2019 to June 2022). Using the occurrence rates and the PCAOB’s descriptions in the CAM implementation guidance, we propose a method for classifying CAM topics as recurring, nonrecurring, and intermittent. Based on our proposed CAM topic recurrence categorization, we find that approximately 68 percent of auditor’s reports include at least one recurring CAM topic. Our findings should help practitioners and other financial reporting stakeholders refine expectations for the recurrence of CAMs. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M42; M48.
The purpose of this study is to review a text topic modeling methodology, latent semantic analysis (LSA), and provide researchers with the requisite knowledge to allow them to learn and implement their own accounting research study using LSA. The authors first provide a brief literature review of prior business and accounting research studies that have utilized the LSA methodology. Using a provided dataset, the authors present details of how to employ LSA in a research study by replicating the mechanics used in an LSA study conducted by Hutchison, Plummer, and George (2018b). Their intent is to present thorough guidance on data selection, the analysis platform, and the necessary steps needed to conduct LSA research. This article also briefly compares LSA with other topic modeling methodologies, presents several accounting research opportunities where LSA could be utilized, and outlines LSA’s limitations.Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text; sample dataset is available for download, see footnote 5.
To help guard against weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting (ICFR), the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires certain filers to have their ICFR assertions audited. Beneish et al. (2008) show that market participants fail to react negatively to adverse ICFR audit opinions. This is puzzling because weak ICFR heightens the risk of fraud or materially misstated financial statements. Our study reexamines this issue for the time periods covered by Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS2) and Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5). We too find no significant negative market reaction to the disclosure of adverse ICFR audits in the AS2 era. However, we show that markets react negatively for first-time disclosures of adverse ICFR audits after the adoption of AS5. Furthermore, in the AS5 regime, markets seem to differentiate between entity-wide versus account-specific ICFR weaknesses. We also show that correcting previous ineffective ICFR results in a positive market reaction. Data Availability: Data are available from sources cited in the text.
SYNOPSIS: Auditing Standard 3101 requires critical audit matter (CAM) disclosure and states an expectation that most audits will include at least one CAM. This study focuses on when auditors report that they have determined that there are no critical audit matters (No CAMs). Our descriptive statistics compare initial years of CAM reporting with recent years, showing that No CAMs have become more common over time. We investigate potential determinants of No CAMs and find a negative relation between No CAMs and clients’ size, accounting reporting complexity, fair value exposure, and events leading to CAMs (i.e., mergers and acquisitions and goodwill impairments). Next, we analyze unexpected No CAMs to examine whether deviating from the PCAOB’s expectation of reporting at least one CAM is a concern. We find that companies with unexpected No CAMs have a higher percentage of financial reporting misstatements and PCAOB audit report-related deficiencies than companies with expected No CAMs. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M42; M48.