11 March 2022 in IEEE Security & Privacy
30 August 2023 in Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages
When runtime verification is used to monitor safety-critical systems, it is essential that monitoring code behaves correctly. The Copilot runtime verification framework pursues this goal by automatically generating C monitor programs from a high-level DSL embedded in Haskell. In safety-critical domains, every piece of deployed code must be accompanied by an assurance argument that is convincing to human auditors. However, it is difficult for auditors to determine with confidence that a compiled monitor cannot crash and implements the behavior required by the Copilot semantics. In this paper we describe CopilotVerifier, which runs alongside the Copilot compiler, generating a proof of correctness for the compiled output. The proof establishes that a given Copilot monitor and its compiled form produce equivalent outputs on equivalent inputs, and that they either crash in identical circumstances or cannot crash. The proof takes the form of a bisimulation broken down into a set of verification conditions. We leverage two pieces of SMT-backed technology: the Crucible symbolic execution library for LLVM and the What4 solver interface library. Our results demonstrate that dramatically increased compiler assurance can be achieved at moderate cost by building on existing tools. This paves the way to our ultimate goal of generating formal assurance arguments that are convincing to human auditors.
20 June 2024 in Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages
Despite decades of contributions to the theoretical foundations of parsing and the many tools available to aid in parser development, many security attacks in the wild still exploit parsers. The issues are myriad—flaws in memory management in contexts lacking memory safety, flaws in syntactic or semantic validation of input, and misinterpretation of hundred-page-plus standards documents. It remains challenging to build and maintain parsers for common, mature data formats. In response to these challenges, we present Daedalus, a new domain-specific language (DSL) and toolchain for writing safe parsers. Daedalus is built around functional-style parser combinators, which suit the rich data dependencies often found in complex data formats. It adds domain-specific constructs for stream manipulation, allowing the natural expression of parsing noncontiguous formats. Balancing between expressivity and domain-specific constructs lends Daedalus specifications simplicity and leaves them amenable to analysis. As a stand-alone DSL, Daedalus is able to generate safe parsers in multiple languages, currently C++ and Haskell. We have implemented 20 data formats with Daedalus, including two large, complex formats—PDF and NITF–and our evaluation shows that Daedalus parsers are concise and performant. Our experience with PDF forms our largest case study. We worked with the PDF Association to build a reference implementation, which was subject to a red-teaming exercise along with a number of other PDF parsers and was the only parser to be found free of defects.
1 September 2026 in IEEE Security & Privacy