From vocabulary learning to imitating sequences of motor actions, the ability to plan, represent, and recall a novel sequence of items in the correct order is fundamental for many verbal and nonverbal higher level cognitive activities. Here we review phenomena of serial order documented across the verbal, visual, and spatial short-term memory domains and interpret them with reference to the principles of serial order and ancillary assumptions instantiated in contemporary computational theories of memory for serial order. We propose that functional similarities across domains buttress the notion that verbal, visual, and spatial sequences are planned and controlled by a competitive queuing (CQ) mechanism in which items are simultaneously active in parallel and the strongest item is chosen for output. Within the verbal short-term memory CQ system, evidence suggests that serial order is represented via a primacy gradient, position marking, response suppression, and cumulative matching. Evidence further indicates that output interference operates during recall and that item similarity effects manifest during both serial order encoding and retrieval. By contrast, the principles underlying the representation of serial order in the visual and spatial CQ systems are unclear, largely because the relevant studies have yet to be performed. In the spatial domain, there is some evidence for a primacy gradient and position marking, whereas in the visual domain there is no direct evidence for either of the principles of serial order. We conclude by proposing some directions for future research designed to bridge this and other theoretical gaps in the literature.
Any mature field of research in psychology-such as short-term/working memory-is characterized by a wealth of empirical findings. It is currently unrealistic to expect a theory to explain them all; theorists must satisfice with explaining a subset of findings. The aim of the present article is to make the choice of that subset less arbitrary and idiosyncratic than is current practice. We propose criteria for identifying benchmark findings that every theory in a field should be able to explain: Benchmarks should be reproducible, generalize across materials and methodological variations, and be theoretically informative. We propose a set of benchmarks for theories and computational models of short-term and working memory. The benchmarks are described in as theory-neutral a way as possible, so that they can serve as empirical common ground for competing theoretical approaches. Benchmarks are rated on three levels according to their priority for explanation. Selection and ratings of the benchmarks is based on consensus among the authors, who jointly represent a broad range of theoretical perspectives on working memory, and they are supported by a survey among other experts on working memory. The article is accompanied by a web page providing an open forum for discussion and for submitting proposals for new benchmarks; and a repository for reference data sets for each benchmark. (PsycINFO Database Record
The public perception of climate change as abstract and distant may undermine climate action. According to construal level theory, whether a phenomenon is perceived as psychologically distant or close is associated with whether it is construed as abstract or concrete, respectively. Previous work has established a link between psychological distance and climate action, but the associated role of construal level has yet to be explored in depth. In two representative surveys of Australians (N = 217 and N = 216), and one experiment (N = 319), we tested whether construal level and psychological distance from climate change predicted pro-environmental intentions and policy support, and whether manipulating distance and construal increased pro-environmental behaviors such as donations. Results showed that psychological closeness to climate change predicted more engagement in pro-environmental behaviors, while construal level produced inconsistent results, and manipulations of both variables failed to produce increases in pro-environmental behaviors. In contrast with the central tenet of construal level theory, construal level was unrelated to psychological distance in all three studies. Our findings suggest that the hypothesized relationship between construal level and psychological distance may not hold in the context of climate change, and that it may be difficult to change pro-environmental behavior by manipulating these variables.
To qualitative researchers, social media offers a novel opportunity to harvest a massive and diverse range of content without the need for intrusive or intensive data collection procedures. However,...
1 April 2013 in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance
The influence of top-down cognitive control on 2 putatively distinct forms of distraction was investigated. Attentional capture by a task-irrelevant auditory deviation (e.g., a female-spoken token following a sequence of male-spoken tokens)-as indexed by its disruption of a visually presented recall task-was abolished when focal-task engagement was promoted either by increasing the difficulty of encoding the visual to-be-remembered stimuli (by reducing their perceptual discriminability; Experiments 1 and 2) or by providing foreknowledge of an imminent deviation (Experiment 2). In contrast, distraction from continuously changing auditory stimuli ("changing-state effect") was not modulated by task-difficulty or foreknowledge (Experiment 3). We also confirmed that individual differences in working memory capacity--typically associated with maintaining task-engagement in the face of distraction--predict the magnitude of the deviation effect, but not the changing-state effect. This convergence of experimental and psychometric data strongly supports a duplex-mechanism account of auditory distraction: Auditory attentional capture (deviation effect) is open to top-down cognitive control, whereas auditory distraction caused by direct conflict between the sound and focal-task processing (changing-state effect) is relatively immune to such control.