Zhuotong Zhou

Zhuotong Zhou

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Zhuotong Zhou

Fudan University, Shanghai, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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27 October 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
ZZZhuotong Zhou
Zhuotong Zhou
YYYongzhuo Yang
Yongzhuo Yang
SWSusheng Wu
Susheng Wu
YHYiheng Huang
Yiheng Huang
BCBihuan Chen
Bihuan Chen
XPXin Peng
Xin Peng
The wide adoption of open source third-party libraries can propagate vulnerabilities that originally exist in third-party libraries through dependency chains to downstream projects. To mitigate this security risk, vulnerability exploitation analysis has been proposed to further reduce false positives of vulnerability reachability analysis. However, existing approaches work less effectively when the vulnerable function of the vulnerable library is indirectly invoked by a client project through a call chain of multiple steps. To address this problem, we propose a step-wise approach, named Magneto, to exploit vulnerabilities in dependent libraries of a client project through LLM-empowered directed fuzzing. Its core idea is to decompose the directed fuzzing for the whole call chain (from the client project to the vulnerable function) into a series of step-wise directed fuzzing for each step of the call chain. To empower directed fuzzing, it leverages LLM to facilitate the initial seed generation. Our evaluation has demonstrated the effectiveness of Magneto over the state-of-the-art; i.e., Magneto achieves an improvement of at least 75.6% in successfully exploiting the vulnerability.

27 October 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
YHYiheng Huang
Yiheng Huang
RWRuisi Wang
Ruisi Wang
WZWen Zheng
Wen Zheng
ZZZhuotong Zhou
Zhuotong Zhou
SWSusheng Wu
Susheng Wu
XPXin Peng
Xin Peng
Open source software (OSS) supply chains have been attractive targets for attacks. One of the significant, popular attacks is realized by malicious packages on package registries. NPM, as the largest package registry, has been recently flooded with malicious packages. In response to this severe security risk, many detection tools have been proposed. However, these tools do not model malicious behavior in a holistic way; only consider a predefined set of sensitive APIs; and require huge manual confirmation effort due to high false positives and binary detection results. Thus, their practical usefulness is hindered. To address these limitations, we propose a practical tool, named SpiderScan, to identify malicious NPM packages based on graph-based behavior modeling and matching. In the offline phase, given a set of malicious packages, SpiderScan models each malicious behavior in a graph that considers control flows and data dependencies across sensitive API calls, while leveraging LLM to recognize sensitive APIs in both built-in modules and third-party dependencies. In the online phase, given a target package, SpiderScan constructs its suspicious behavior graphs and matches them with malicious behavior graphs, and uses dynamic analysis and LLM to confirm the maliciousness only for certain malicious behaviors. Our extensive evaluation has demonstrated the effectiveness of SpiderScan over the state-of-the-art. SpiderScan has detected 249 new malicious packages in NPM, and received 70 thank letters from the official team of NPM.

19 June 2025 in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SWSusheng Wu
Susheng Wu
RWRuisi Wang
Ruisi Wang
YCYiheng Cao
Yiheng Cao
BCBihuan Chen
Bihuan Chen
ZZZhuotong Zhou
Zhuotong Zhou
XPXin Peng
Xin Peng
Branching repositories facilitates efficient software development but can also inadvertently propagate vulnerabilities. When an original branch is patched, other unfixed branches remain vulnerable unless the patch is successfully ported. However, due to inherent discrepancies between branches, many patches cannot be directly applied and require manual intervention, which is time-consuming and leads to delays in patch porting, increasing vulnerability risks. Existing automated patch porting approaches are prone to errors, as they often overlook essential semantic and syntactic context of vulnerability and fail to detect or refine faulty patches. We propose Mystique, a novel LLM-based approach to address these limitations. Mystique first slices the semantic-related statements linked to the vulnerability while ensuring syntactic correctness, allowing it to extract the signatures for both the original patched function and the target vulnerable function. Mystique then utilizes a fine-tuned LLM to generate a fixed function, which is further iteratively checked and refined to ensure successful porting. Our evaluation shows that Mystique achieved a success rate of 0.954 at function level and of 0.924 at CVE level, outperforming state-of-the-art approaches by at least 13.2% at function level and 12.3% at CVE level. Our evaluation also demonstrates Mystique’s superior generality across various projects, bugs, and programming languages. Mystique successfully ported patches for 34 real-world vulnerable branches.

27 October 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SWSusheng Wu
Susheng Wu
RWRuisi Wang
Ruisi Wang
KHKaifeng Huang
Kaifeng Huang
YCYiheng Cao
Yiheng Cao
WSWenyan Song
Wenyan Song
XPXin Peng
Xin Peng
Vulnerability reports play a crucial role in mitigating open-source software risks. Typically, the vulnerability report contains affected versions of a software. However, despite the validation by security expert who discovers and vendors who review, the affected versions are not always accurate. Especially, the complexity of maintaining its accuracy increases significantly when dealing with multiple versions and their differences. Several advances have been made to identify affected versions. However, they still face limitations. First, some existing approaches identify affected versions based on repository-hosting platforms (i.e., GitHub), but these versions are not always consistent with those in package registries (i.e., Maven). Second, existing approaches fail to distinguish the importance of different vulnerable methods and patched statements in face of vulnerabilities with multiple methods and change hunks. To address these problems, this paper proposes a novel approach, Vision, to accurately identify affected library versions (ALVs) for vulnerabilities. Vision uses library versions from the package registry as inputs. To distinguish the importance of vulnerable methods and patched statements, Vision performs critical method selection and critical statement selection to prioritize important changes and their context. Furthermore, the vulnerability signature is represented by weighted inter-procedural program dependency graphs that incorporate critical methods and statements. Vision determines ALVs based on the similarities between these weighted graphs. Our evaluation demonstrates that Vision outperforms state-of-the-art approaches, achieving a precision of 0.91 and a recall of 0.94. Additionally, our evaluation shows the practical usefulness of Vision in correcting affected versions in existing vulnerability databases.

11 September 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
KHKaifeng Huang
Kaifeng Huang
YXYingfeng Xia
Yingfeng Xia
BCBihuan Chen
Bihuan Chen
SHSiyang He
Siyang He
HZHuazheng Zeng
Huazheng Zeng
XPXin Peng
Xin Peng
Open source software brings benefit to the software community but also introduces legal risks caused by license violations, which result in serious consequences such as lawsuits and financial losses. To mitigate legal risks, some approaches have been proposed to identify licenses, detect license incompatibilities and inconsistencies, and recommend licenses. As far as we know, however, there is no prior work to understand modification terms in open source licenses or to detect and fix violations of modification terms. To bridge this gap, we first empirically characterize modification terms in 48 open source licenses. These licenses all require certain forms of “notice” to describe the modifications made to the original work. Inspired by our study, we then design LiVo to automatically detect and fix violations of modification terms in open source licenses during forking. Our evaluation has shown the effectiveness and efficiency of LiVo. 18 pull requests for fixing modification term violations have received positive responses. 8 have been merged.

22 June 2025 in Proceedings of the ACM on Software Engineering
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
YCYiheng Cao
Yiheng Cao
SWSusheng Wu
Susheng Wu
RWRuisi Wang
Ruisi Wang
BCBihuan Chen
Bihuan Chen
YHYiheng Huang
Yiheng Huang
XPXin Peng
Xin Peng
With the rapid development of open-source software, code reuse has become a common practice to accelerate development. However, it leads to inheritance from the original vulnerability, which recurs at the reusing projects, known as recurring vulnerabilities (RVs). Traditional general-purpose vulnerability detection approaches struggle with scalability and adaptability, while learning-based approaches are often constrained by limited training datasets and are less effective against unseen vulnerabilities. Though specific recurring vulnerability detection (RVD) approaches have been proposed, their effectiveness across various RV characteristics remains unclear. In this paper, we conduct a large-scale empirical study using a newly constructed RV dataset containing 4,569 RVs, achieving a 953% expansion over prior RV datasets. Our study analyzes the characteristics of RVs, evaluates the effectiveness of the state-of-the-art RVD approaches, and investigates the root causes of false positives and false negatives, yielding key insights. Inspired by these insights, we design AntMan, a novel RVD approach that identifies both explicit and implicit call relations with modified functions, then employs inter-procedural taint analysis and intra-procedural dependency slicing within those functions to generate comprehensive signatures, and finally incorporates a flexible matching to detect RVs. Our evaluation has shown the effectiveness, generality and practical usefulness in RVD. AntManhas detected 4,593 RVs, with 307 confirmed by developers, and identified 73 new 0-day vulnerabilities across 15 projects, receiving 5 CVE identifiers.