Robert T. Foley

Robert T. Foley

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Robert T. Foley

Reader in Defence Studies, King's College London at the Joint Services Command and Staff College

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

25Years (2002-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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17 March 2011 in International Affairs
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RFRobert T. Foley
Robert T. Foley
SGStuart Griffin
Stuart Griffin
HMHelen Mccartney
Helen Mccartney

15 May 2012 in Journal of Strategic Studies
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RFRobert T. Foley
Robert T. Foley
Using the German Army from 1916 to 1918 as a case study, this article demonstrates a different form of military innovation than has hitherto been analysed by literature on the subject. During World War I, the German Army innovated by spreading knowledge between units rather than up and downthe chain of command. Thus, this army used ‘horizontal innovation’, rather than vertical innovation to change how it fought in the midst of battle. Although combat in World War I is significantly different from operations today, horizontal innovation offers armed forces a means by which to transform themselves much more rapidly than the traditionally recognised forms of military innovation.

14 March 2014 in International Affairs
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RFRobert T. Foley
Robert T. Foley

1 April 2003 in War in History
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Robert T. Foley


1 January 2006 in War in History
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RFRobert T. Foley
Robert T. Foley
In recent years Terence Zuber has maintained that the document commonly known as the ‘Schlieffen Plan’ was, in fact, no real war plan. This article takes issue with Zuber’s far-ranging conclusions. It examines his use of sources, places German war planning in its wider political context, and considers evidence overlooked by Zuber. It demonstrates how a fundamental shift occurred in Germany’s strategic situation in 1905 and how this shift led to change in Germany’s war plans. Schlieffen’s 1905 memorandum took account of this strategic change and allowed Schlieffen at last to place at the heart of his war plan ideas he had been developing since the 1890s. Although modifications were made to meet changes in Germany’s strategic situation, this memorandum served as the basis for all German war plans before 1914. Thus, Schlieffen deserves to be remembered as the father of Germany’s war plan, with all its strengths and weaknesses, in 1914.