8 February 2022 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Existing research work has identified a new class of attacks that can eavesdrop on the keystrokes in a non-invasive way without infecting the target computer to install malware. The common idea is that pressing a key of a keyboard can cause a unique and subtle environmental change, which can be captured and analyzed by the eavesdropper to learn the keystrokes. For these attacks, however, a training phase must be accomplished to establish the relationship between an observed environmental change and the action of pressing a specific key. This significantly limits the impact and practicality of these attacks. In this paper, we discover that it is possible to design keystroke eavesdropping attacks without requiring the training phase. We create this attack based on the channel state information extracted from the wireless signal. To eavesdrop on keystrokes, we establish a mapping between typing each letter and its respective environmental change by exploiting the correlation among observed changes and known structures of dictionary words. To defend against this attack, we propose a reactive jamming mechanism that launches the jamming only during the typing period. Experimental results on software-defined radio platforms validate the impact of the attack and the performance of the defense.
7 January 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Due to the open nature of wireless medium, wireless communications are especially vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks. This paper designs a new wireless communication system to deal with eavesdropping attacks. The proposed system can enable a legitimate receiver to get desired messages and meanwhile an eavesdropper to hear ``fake" but meaningful messages by combining confidentiality and deception, thereby confusing the eavesdropper and achieving additional concealment that further protects exchanged messages. Towards this goal, we propose techniques that can conceal exchanged messages by utilizing wireless channel characteristics between the transmitter and the receiver, as well as techniques that can attract an eavesdropper to gradually approach a trap region, where the eavesdropper can get fake messages. We also provide both theoretical and empirical analysis of the established secure channel between the transmitter and the receiver. We develop a prototype system using Universal Software Defined Radio Peripherals (USRPs)Experimental results show that an eavesdropper at a trap location can receive fake information with a bit error rate (BER) close to 0, and the transmitter with multiple antennas can successfully deploy a trap area.
4 September 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Wireless communication is easily eavesdropped due to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium. This has spurred extensive research into secret key establishment using physical layer characteristics of wireless channels. In all these schemes, the secret keys directly originate from the physical features of the real wireless channel, which is highly dependent on the communication environment nearby. Also, previous schemes require performing information reconciliation, which increases both the costs and the risk of key leakage. In this paper, we exhibit a novel wireless key establishment method allowing the transmitter to specify arbitrary content as the key and cause the receiver to obtain the same key leveraging a channel manipulation technique. We furthermore enable the transmitter to apply error-correction code to the key, so that the receiver can automatically correct any mismatched bits without sending key-related information back to the transmitter over the public channel. Experimental results demonstrate that our key establishment method reaches a success rate as high as 91.0% for establishing a 168-bit key between the transmitter and the receiver, and meanwhile the chance that the eavesdropper can infer the key in meter-order range of the receiver is subdued into the range of $0\sim 0.10\%\;$ .
7 March 2024 in IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
Due to the ubiquitous deployment of wireless infrastructures, the radio signal nature of invisibility, and the elimination of the line-of-sight requirement, it has drawn increasing attention in both academia and industry to infer various human-motion related sensitive information, called human profile information (HPI). The basic idea of these techniques is that varying human profiles (i.e., physiological characteristics and motion patterns) may lead to unique and subtle disturbances in environmental wireless signals, which can be then measured and processed to learn HPI. In this survey, we comprehensively review different categories of existing studies based on (1) how they quantize the motion-induced wireless disturbances in concrete wireless measurements; (2) the signal processing techniques for building wireless HPI inference systems; and (3) practical applications that take advantage of inferred HPI. Also, the survey discusses the emerging challenges and future directions on wireless HPI inference.
13 September 2024 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Breathing rates and crowd counting can be used to verify the human presence, especially the former one can disclose a person’s physiological status. Many studies have demonstrated success in applying channel state information (CSI) to estimate the breathing rates of stationary individuals and count the number of people in motion. Due to the invisibility of radio signals, the ubiquitous deployment of wireless infrastructures, and the elimination of the line-of-sight (LOS) requirement, such wireless inference techniques can surreptitiously work and violate user privacy. However, little research has been conducted specifically in mitigating misuse of those techniques. This paper proposes new proactive countermeasures against all existing CSI-based vital signs and crowd counting inference methods. Specifically, we set up ambush locations with carefully designed wireless signals, allowing eavesdroppers to infer a false breathing rate or person count specified by the transmitter. The true breathing rate or person count is thus protected. Experimental results on software-defined radio platforms with 5 participants demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed defenses. An eavesdropper can be misled into believing any desired breathing rate with an error of less than 1.2 bpm when the user lies on a bed in a bedroom, and 0.9 bpm when the user sits in a chair in an office room. Additionally, our proposed defense mechanisms can deceive an attacker into believing there are moving individuals in an empty room with a 100% success rate, using both Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Decision Tree (DT) classifiers.