Sam Blackshear

Sam Blackshear

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Sam Blackshear

Mysten Labs, Palo Alto, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

5Years (2022-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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2 December 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SBSam Blackshear
Sam Blackshear
ACAndrey Chursin
Andrey Chursin
GDGeorge Danezis
George Danezis
AKAnastasios Kichidis
Anastasios Kichidis
LKLefteris Kokoris-Kogias
Lefteris Kokoris-Kogias
LZLu Zhang
Lu Zhang
Sui Lutris is the first smart-contract platform to sustainably achieve sub-second finality. It achieves this significant decrease by employing consensusless agreement not only for simple payments but for a large variety of transactions. Unlike prior work, Sui Lutris neither compromises expressiveness nor throughput and can run perpetually without restarts. Sui Lutris achieves this by safely integrating consensuless agreement with a high-throughput consensus protocol that is invoked out of the critical finality path but ensures that when a transaction is at risk of inconsistent concurrent accesses, its settlement is delayed until the total ordering is resolved. Building such a hybrid architecture is especially delicate during reconfiguration events, where the system needs to preserve the safety of the consensusless path without compromising the long-term liveness of potentially misconfigured clients. We thus develop a novel reconfiguration protocol, the first to provably show the safe and efficient reconfiguration of a consensusless blockchain. Sui Lutris is currently running in production and underpins the Sui smart-contract platform. Combined with the use of Objects instead of accounts it enables the safe execution of smart contracts that expose objects as a first-class resource. In our experiments Sui Lutris achieves latency lower than 0.5 seconds for throughput up to 5,000 certificates per second (150k ops/s with transaction blocks), compared to the state-of-the-art real-world consensus latencies of 3 seconds. Furthermore, it gracefully handles validators crash-recovery and does not suffer visible performance degradation during reconfiguration.

23 June 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
RKRabimba Karanjai
Rabimba Karanjai
SBSam Blackshear
Sam Blackshear
LXLei Xu
Lei Xu
WSWeidong Shi
Weidong Shi

13 May 2022 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
MPMarco Patrignani
Marco Patrignani
SBSam Blackshear
Sam Blackshear
A program that maintains key safety properties even when interacting with arbitrary untrusted code is said to enjoy \emph{robust safety}. Proving that a program written in a mainstream language is robustly safe is typically challenging because it requires static verification tools that work precisely even in the presence of language features like dynamic dispatch and shared mutability. The emerging \move programming language was designed to support strong encapsulation and static verification in the service of secure smart contract programming. However, the language design has not been analyzed using a theoretical framework like robust safety. In this paper, we define robust safety for the \move language and introduce a generic framework for static tools that wish to enforce it. Our framework consists of two abstract components: a program verifier that can prove an invariant holds in a closed-world setting (e.g., the Move Prover), and a novel \emph{encapsulator} that checks if the verifier's result generalizes to an open-world setting. We formalise an escape analysis as an instantiation of the encapsulator and prove that it attains the required security properties. Finally, we implement our encapsulator as an extension to the Move Prover and use the combination to analyze a representative benchmark set of real-world \move programs. This toolchain certifies $>$99\% of the \move modules we analyze, validating that automatic enforcement of strong security properties like robust safety is practical for \move.

1 October 2026 in Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
TNTodd Nowacki
Todd Nowacki
SBSam Blackshear
Sam Blackshear
JMJohn Mitchell
John Mitchell
SQShaz Qadeer
Shaz Qadeer
ISIlya Sergey
Ilya Sergey
Safe systems languages such as Rust enforce an ownership discipline through types: every value has a unique owner, and the type system tracks borrows—references that provide temporary access to values without transferring their ownership. Borrow checking is a static analysis ensuring that no borrow outlives its owner and that no two mutable borrows are aliases, preventing dangling references and data races at compile time. Move, a smart contract language deployed on Sui and Aptos blockchains, adopts this model but restricts references to structured access paths rooted in local variables, eliminating the need for complex lifetime tracking mechanisms such as lifetime annotations. We present a novel type system for Move's borrow checker in which access paths are tracked by regular expressions. In this model, Brzozowski derivatives make it possible to express the reachability consequences of borrowing operations, Kleene star summarises borrow chains from function calls and loops, and the aliasing check reduces to the decidable regex emptiness. The design of the type system with regular expression-based borrow tracking extends naturally to vectors and enumeration types. The proposed design of a borrow checker has been implemented in the Move bytecode verifier for Sui blockchain, where it superseded the original borrow analyser while maintaining full backwards compatibility. We mechanised the type system in Lean with a machine-checked soundness proof and an executable algorithmic type checker tested against the production Move compiler. Notably, this 39,000-line metatheory was developed with an AI proof assistant in roughly one month, and we report on our experience of conducting this proof effort, which is among the largest AI-assisted PL metatheory mechanisations to date.