Background: With multi-stakeholder approaches central to efforts to address global health challenges, debates around conflict of interest (COI) are increasingly prominent. The World Health Organization (WHO) recently developed a proposed tool to support member states in preventing and managing COI in nutrition policy. We analysed responses to an online consultation to explore how actors from across sectors understand COI and the ways in which they use this concept to frame the terms of commercial sector engagement in health governance. Methods: Submissions from 44 Member States, international organisations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academic institutions and commercial sector actors were coded using a thematic framework informed by framing theory. Respondents’ orientation to the tool aligned with two broad frames, ie, a ‘collaboration and partnership’ frame that endorsed multi-stakeholder approaches and a ‘restricted engagement’ frame that highlighted core tensions between public health and food industry actors. Results: Responses to the WHO tool reflected contrasting conceptualisations of COI and implications for health governance. While most Member States, NGOs, and academic institutions strongly supported the tool, commercial sector organisations depicted it as inappropriate, unworkable and incompatible with the Sustainable Development Goals (SGDs). Commercial sector respondents advanced a narrow, individual-level understanding of COI, seen as adequately addressed by existing mechanisms for disclosure, and viewed the WHO tool as unduly restricting scope for private sector engagement in nutrition policy. In contrast, health-focused NGOs and several Member States drew on a more expansive understanding of COI that recognised scope for wider tensions between public health goals and commercial interests and associated governance challenges. These submissions mostly welcomed the tool as an innovative approach to preventing and managing such conflicts, although some NGOs sought broader exclusion of corporate actors from policy engagement. Conclusion: Submissions on the WHO tool illustrate how contrasting positions on COI are central to understanding broader debates in nutrition policy and across global health governance. Effective health governance requires greater understanding of how COI can be conceptualised and managed amid high levels of contestation on policy engagement with commercial sector actors. This requires both ongoing innovation in governance tools and more extensive conceptual and empirical research.
Support for a high-ambition plastics treaty is gaining strength, particularly within global civil society and among lower-income developing countries. Still, opposition to binding measures – such as obligations to regulate petrochemicals or reduce global plastics production – remains intense and widespread. We propose the concept of a “petrochemical historical bloc” to help reveal the depth and extent of the forces opposing strong global governance of plastics. At the bloc’s core are petrostates and industry, especially producers of oil and gas feedstock, petrochemicals and plastics. Extending its influence are broader social forces – including certain political and economic institutions, consultancy firms and nongovernmental organizations – that reinforce and legitimize the discourses and tactics thwarting a high-ambition treaty. This bloc is driving up plastics production, externalizing the costs of pollution, distorting scientific knowledge and lobbying to derail negotiations. Yet the petrochemical historical bloc is neither monolithic nor all-powerful. Investigating differing interests and evolving politics within this bloc, we contend, can expose disingenuous rhetoric, weaken low-ambition alliances and reveal opportunities to overcome resistance to ambitious governance. In light of this, and toward highlighting fractures and potential counter-alliances and strategies, we call for a global research inquiry to map the full scope and nature of the petrochemical historical bloc.
Introduction: Despite an extensive evidence base on the diverse economic, environmental and social benefits of tobacco control, difficulties in establishing coordinated national approaches remain a defining challenge for Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) implementation. Minimising tobacco industry interference is seen as key to effective coordination, and this paper analyses implementation of Article 5.3 guidelines, exploring implications for whole-of-government approaches to tobacco control in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, India and Uganda.Methods: Based on 131 semistructured interviews with government officials and other key stakeholders, we explore barriers and facilitators for promoting: (1)horizontal coordinationacross health and other policy spheres, and (2)vertical coordinationacross national and subnational governments on Article 5.3 implementation.Results: Our analysis identifies common barriers to coordination across diverse geographical contexts and varying approaches to implementation. They highlight broadly shared experiences of limited understanding and engagement beyond health agencies; restricted responsibility and uncertainty amid conflicting mandates; tensions with wider governance practices and norms; limited capacity and authority of coordination mechanisms; and obstacles to vertical coordination across local, state and national governments. Interview data also indicate important opportunities to advance coordination across sectors and government levels, with Article 5.3 measures capable of informing changes in practices, building support in other sectors, allowing for ‘bottom-up’ innovation and being shaped by engagement with civil society.Conclusion: Supporting effective implementation of Article 5.3 is key to advancing multisectoral approaches to FCTC implementation and tobacco control’s contributions to global health and sustainable development.
The concept of the ‘commercial determinants of health’ (CDOH) has been developed by public health researchers as a way to describe the political economy of corporations and the impact of their practices on health, social inequalities and climate change. In this analysis, we assess the conceptual work that has developed this field and the influence of the more established ‘social determinants of health’ models. We highlight the dominance of epidemiologic and biomedical concepts on understandings of structure and agency in the CDOH literature and argue that the terminology of ‘risk factors’, ‘drivers’ and ‘pathways’ reflects an agent-centred approach. We suggest that, as a result, there is a tendency to overlook the importance of political institutions in shaping the exercise of corporate power. Our analysis seeks to ‘bring institutions in’ to CDOH research, using the empirical cases of Health in All Policies and Better Regulation in the European Union to highlight how institutional contexts shape political legitimacy and accountability, and in turn the strategies of corporate actors. Institutionalist approaches, we argue, have the potential to develop and expand understandings of CDOH by opening the black box between agency and structure.
The intensification of efforts by state and nonstate actors to address issues affecting global health has produced a patchwork of transnational regulatory governance. Within this field, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are expected to perform authoritative roles in holding business actors to account and enhance the democratic legitimacy of institutions via their participation in governance processes. While there exists a large body of conceptual and empirical research on global business regulation and private authority, we surprisingly know little about the governance functions of NGOs engaged in influencing the practices of corporations that produce health-harming commodities. This knowledge gap is especially pronounced in the issue area of noncommunicable diseases. This article begins to address this gap by mapping the networks of NGOs that engage in regulatory activities (rule-setting, monitoring, and enforcement) related to the (ultra)processed food and alcohol industries. We identify the networks of NGOs involved in global policy making across health, regulatory standards, and multistakeholder initiatives using nonstate actor submissions to consultations held by World Health Organization, UN Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex), and the UN Global Compact. This paper examines NGO governance functions and their patterns of engagement and participation across institutional spheres. Overall, the article makes a twofold contribution to existing debates. First, we identify the governance functions through which NGOs attempt to hold corporations to account, contrasting their “watchdog” function with other governance functions. Second, we examine the representation of NGOs, highlighting asymmetries in participation of NGOs in the Global North and South.