This article analyses the property tax reform in China in a computable general equilibrium model that recognizes the interaction between and among housing markets in different provinces and macroeconomic development. Using real data in 2010, we present the benchmark equilibrium for reference property and income tax rates. Then, we examine different property and income tax policies and make a comparison of their production, consumption, welfare and national income. We find that the implementation of property tax would decrease the house production at the expense of welfare in taxed area. The expansion of the taxed regions may increase the total social welfare and national income. Even though property tax policy may not be able to change the income distribution in China, increasing income tax rate could narrow the income disparity. Finally, this article shows the reliability of the conclusions when sensitivity analysis on optimal condition of equilibrium computation is performed under varied property tax policy.
We examine how increasing market concentration, driven by dominant institutional investors, affects investor behavior and price dynamics. We develop a two-period non-competitive model in which large investors with market power trade strategically against small pricetakers. Large investors’ market power induces trading persistence, as they adjust their portfolios only partially due to price impact. Greater concentration amplifies this persistence. Under symmetric information, market concentration monotonically increases price reversals and volatility. Under asymmetric information, its effect is hump-shaped: moderate concentration enhances efficiency by improving price informativeness, reducing price reversals and volatility, while excessive dominance reverses these gains, reducing efficiency and stability.
1 February 2024 in The European Journal of Finance