Chris Smeenk

Chris Smeenk

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Chris Smeenk

Department of Philosophy and Rotman Institute of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario, London, ON N6A 5BY, Canada

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

18Years (2009-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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2 September 2011
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Book
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CSChris Smeenk
Chris Smeenk
CWChristian Wüthrich
Christian Wüthrich
This chapter examines the logical, metaphysical, and physical possibility of time travel understood in the sense of the existence of closed worldlines that can be traced out by physical objects, arguing that none of the purported paradoxes rule out time travel on the grounds of either logic or metaphysics. More relevantly, modern space–time theories such as general relativity seem to permit models that feature closed worldlines. The chapter discusses what this apparent physical possibility of time travel means, and, furthermore, reviews the recent literature on so-called time machines, of devices that produce closed worldlines where none would have existed otherwise. Finally, it investigates what the implications of the quantum behavior of matter might be for the possibility of time travel, and explicates in what sense time travel might be possible according to leading contenders for full quantum theories of gravity such as string theory and loop quantum gravity.

19 April 2018
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Book Chapter
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CSChris Smeenk
Chris Smeenk

22 April 2022 in Philosophy of Science
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Journal Article
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AKAdam Koberinski
Adam Koberinski
CSChris Smeenk
Chris Smeenk
The cosmological constant problem stems from treating quantum field theory and general relativity as an effective field theory (EFT). We argue that the problem is a reduction ad absurdum and that one should reject the assumption that general relativity can generically be treated as an EFT. This marks a failure of naturalness and provides an internal signal that EFT methods do not apply in all spacetime domains. We then take an external view, showing that the assumptions for using EFTs are violated in general relativistic domains where Λ is relevant. We highlight some ways forward that do not depend on naturalness.

29 March 2023 in Philosophy of Science
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NLNiels Linnemann
Niels Linnemann
CSChris Smeenk
Chris Smeenk
MBMark Robert Baker
Mark Robert Baker
The self-interaction spin-2 approach to GR has been extremely influential in the particle physics community. Leaving no doubt regarding its heuristic value, we argue that any view of the metric field of GR as nothing but a stand-in for a self-coupling field in at spacetime runs into a dilemma: either the view is physically incomplete in so far as it requires recourse to GR after all, or it leads to an absurd multiplication of alternative viewpoints on GR rendering any understanding of the metric field as nothing but a spin-2 field in at spacetime unjustified.

5 March 2023 in Universe
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AKAdam Koberinski
Adam Koberinski
BFBridget Falck
Bridget Falck
CSChris Smeenk
Chris Smeenk
The (re)introduction of Λ into cosmology has spurred debates that touch on central questions in philosophy of science, as well as the foundations of general relativity and particle physics. We provide a systematic assessment of the often implicit philosophical assumptions guiding the methodology of precision cosmology in relation to dark energy. We start by briefly introducing a recent account of scientific progress in terms of risky and constrained lines of inquiry. This allows us to contrast aspects of Λ that make it relevantly different from other theoretical entities in science, such as its remoteness from direct observation or manipulability. We lay out a classification for possible ways to explain apparent accelerated expansion but conclude that these conceptually clear distinctions may blur heavily in practice. Finally, we consider the important role played in cosmology by critical tests of background assumptions, approximation techniques, and core principles, arguing that the weak anthropic principle fits into this category. We argue that some core typicality assumptions—such as the Copernican principle and the cosmological principle—are necessary though not provable, while others—such as the strong anthropic principle and appeals to naturalness or probability in the multiverse—are not similarly justifiable.

25 May 2022 in Philosophy of Science
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CSChris Smeenk
Chris Smeenk
Cosmologists take the ΛCDM model to be a permanent contribution to our knowledge of the universe, based on the success of precision cosmology. Consistent, independent determinations of the parameters in this model encourage physicists to take it seriously. This stance incurs an obligation to resolve any discrepancies, by reanalyzing measurements or adding further complexity. Recent observations in cosmology indicate a tension between “local” and “global” determinations of the Hubble constant. Here I will argue that this tension illustrates one of the benefits of taking the model seriously, and consider the challenges to making a case for the permanence of ΛCDM.