Alan Chan

Alan Chan

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Alan Chan

Centre for the Governance of AI, United Kingdom and Mila (Quebec AI Institute), Canada

Research Focus & Metrics

Representative Publications

View All Publications
12 June 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
ACAlan Chan
Alan Chan
RSRebecca Salganik
Rebecca Salganik
AMAlva Markelius
Alva Markelius
CPChris Pang
Chris Pang
NRNitarshan Rajkumar
Nitarshan Rajkumar
TMTegan Maharaj
Tegan Maharaj
Research in Fairness, Accountability, Transparency, and Ethics (FATE)1 has established many sources and forms of algorithmic harm, in domains as diverse as health care, finance, policing, and recommendations. Much work remains to be done to mitigate the serious harms of these systems, particularly those disproportionately affecting marginalized communities. Despite these ongoing harms, new systems are being developed and deployed, typically without strong regulatory barriers, threatening the perpetuation of the same harms and the creation of novel ones. In response, the FATE community has emphasized the importance of anticipating harms, rather than just responding to them. Anticipation of harms is especially important given the rapid pace of developments in machine learning (ML). Our work focuses on the anticipation of harms from increasingly agentic systems. Rather than providing a definition of agency as a binary property, we identify 4 key characteristics which, particularly in combination, tend to increase the agency of a given algorithmic system: underspecification, directness of impact, goal-directedness, and long-term planning. We also discuss important harms which arise from increasing agency – notably, these include systemic and/or long-range impacts, often on marginalized or unconsidered stakeholders. We emphasize that recognizing agency of algorithmic systems does not absolve or shift the human responsibility for algorithmic harms. Rather, we use the term agency to highlight the increasingly evident fact that ML systems are not fully under human control. Our work explores increasingly agentic algorithmic systems in three parts. First, we explain the notion of an increase in agency for algorithmic systems in the context of diverse perspectives on agency across disciplines. Second, we argue for the need to anticipate harms from increasingly agentic systems. Third, we discuss important harms from increasingly agentic systems and ways forward for addressing them. We conclude by reflecting on implications of our work for anticipating algorithmic harms from emerging systems.

3 June 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
SCStephen Casper
Stephen Casper
CECarson Ezell
Carson Ezell
CSCharlotte Siegmann
Charlotte Siegmann
NKNoam Kolt
Noam Kolt
TCTaylor Lynn Curtis
Taylor Lynn Curtis
DHDylan Hadfield-Menell
Dylan Hadfield-Menell
External audits of AI systems are increasingly recognized as a key mechanism for AI governance. The effectiveness of an audit, however, depends on the degree of access granted to auditors. Recent audits of state-of-the-art AI systems have primarily relied on black-box access, in which auditors can only query the system and observe its outputs. However, white-box access to the system’s inner workings (e.g., weights, activations, gradients) allows an auditor to perform stronger attacks, more thoroughly interpret models, and conduct fine-tuning. Meanwhile, outside-the-box access to training and deployment information (e.g., methodology, code, documentation, data, deployment details, findings from internal evaluations) allows auditors to scrutinize the development process and design more targeted evaluations. In this paper, we examine the limitations of black-box audits and the advantages of white- and outside-the-box audits. We also discuss technical, physical, and legal safeguards for performing these audits with minimal security risks. Given that different forms of access can lead to very different levels of evaluation, we conclude that (1) transparency regarding the access and methods used by auditors is necessary to properly interpret audit results, and (2) white- and outside-the-box access allow for substantially more scrutiny than black-box access alone.

3 June 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
ACAlan Chan
Alan Chan
CECarson Ezell
Carson Ezell
MKMax Kaufmann
Max Kaufmann
KWKevin Wei
Kevin Wei
LHLewis Hammond
Lewis Hammond
MAMarkus Anderljung
Markus Anderljung
Increased delegation of commercial, scientific, governmental, and personal activities to AI agents—systems capable of pursuing complex goals with limited supervision—may exacerbate existing societal risks and introduce new risks. Understanding and mitigating these risks involves critically evaluating existing governance structures, revising and adapting these structures where needed, and ensuring accountability of key stakeholders. Information about where, why, how, and by whom certain AI agents are used, which we refer to as visibility, is critical to these objectives. In this paper, we assess three categories of measures to increase visibility into AI agents: agent identifiers, real-time monitoring, and activity logging. For each, we outline potential implementations that vary in intrusiveness and informativeness. We analyze how the measures apply across a spectrum of centralized through decentralized deployment contexts, accounting for various actors in the supply chain including hardware and software service providers. Finally, we discuss the implications of our measures for privacy and concentration of power. Further work into understanding the measures and mitigating their negative impacts can help to build a foundation for the governance of AI agents.

30 October 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MCMicah Carroll
Micah Carroll
ACAlan Chan
Alan Chan
HAHenry Ashton
Henry Ashton
DKDavid Krueger
David Krueger

8 August 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
ACAlan Chan
Alan Chan
HBHerbie Bradley
Herbie Bradley
NRNitarshan Rajkumar
Nitarshan Rajkumar