Leif D. Nelson

Leif D. Nelson

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Leif D. Nelson

University of California, Berkeley

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

22Years (2005-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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27 July 2020 in Nature Human Behaviour
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Journal Article
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USUri Simonsohn
Uri Simonsohn
JSJoseph P. Simmons
Joseph P. Simmons
LNLeif D. Nelson
Leif D. Nelson

4 January 2018 in Annual Review of Psychology
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Journal Article
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LNLeif D. Nelson
Leif D. Nelson
JSJoseph Simmons
Joseph Simmons
USUri Simonsohn
Uri Simonsohn
In 2010–2012, a few largely coincidental events led experimental psychologists to realize that their approach to collecting, analyzing, and reporting data made it too easy to publish false-positive findings. This sparked a period of methodological reflection that we review here and call Psychology's Renaissance. We begin by describing how psychologists’ concerns with publication bias shifted from worrying about file-drawered studies to worrying about p-hacked analyses. We then review the methodological changes that psychologists have proposed and, in some cases, embraced. In describing how the renaissance has unfolded, we attempt to describe different points of view fairly but not neutrally, so as to identify the most promising paths forward. In so doing, we champion disclosure and preregistration, express skepticism about most statistical solutions to publication bias, take positions on the analysis and interpretation of replication failures, and contend that meta-analytical thinking increases the prevalence of false positives. Our general thesis is that the scientific practices of experimental psychologists have improved dramatically.

28 October 2021 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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MOMichael O’dOnnell
Michael O’dOnnell
ADAmelia S. Dev
Amelia S. Dev
SAStephen Antonoplis
Stephen Antonoplis
SBStephen M. Baum
Stephen M. Baum
ABArianna H. Benedetti
Arianna H. Benedetti
LNLeif D. Nelson
Leif D. Nelson
Empirical audit and review is an approach to assessing the evidentiary value of a research area. It involves identifying a topic and selecting a cross-section of studies for replication. We apply the method to research on the psychological consequences of scarcity. Starting with the papers citing a seminal publication in the field, we conducted replications of 20 studies that evaluate the role of scarcity priming in pain sensitivity, resource allocation, materialism, and many other domains. There was considerable variability in the replicability, with some strong successes and other undeniable failures. Empirical audit and review does not attempt to assign an overall replication rate for a heterogeneous field, but rather facilitates researchers seeking to incorporate strength of evidence as they refine theories and plan new investigations in the research area. This method allows for an integration of qualitative and quantitative approaches to review and enables the growth of a cumulative science.

21 February 2018 in Perspectives on Psychological Science
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Journal Article
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MOMichael O’dOnnell
Michael O’dOnnell
LNLeif D. Nelson
Leif D. Nelson
EAEvi Ackermann
Evi Ackermann
BABalazs Aczel
Balazs Aczel
AAAthfah Akhtar
Athfah Akhtar
MZMark Zrubka
Mark Zrubka
Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1998) reported that participants primed with a category associated with intelligence (“professor”) subsequently performed 13% better on a trivia test than participants primed with a category associated with a lack of intelligence (“soccer hooligans”). In two unpublished replications of this study designed to verify the appropriate testing procedures, Dijksterhuis, van Knippenberg, and Holland observed a smaller difference between conditions (2%–3%) as well as a gender difference: Men showed the effect (9.3% and 7.6%), but women did not (0.3% and −0.3%). The procedure used in those replications served as the basis for this multilab Registered Replication Report. A total of 40 laboratories collected data for this project, and 23 of these laboratories met all inclusion criteria. Here we report the meta-analytic results for those 23 direct replications (total N = 4,493), which tested whether performance on a 30-item general-knowledge trivia task differed between these two priming conditions (results of supplementary analyses of the data from all 40 labs, N = 6,454, are also reported). We observed no overall difference in trivia performance between participants primed with the “professor” category and those primed with the “hooligan” category (0.14%) and no moderation by gender.

1 October 2020 in Management Science
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Journal Article
Closed access
AMAlice Moon
Alice Moon
LNLeif D. Nelson
Leif D. Nelson
Do people have an irrational dislike for risk? People pay less for uncertain prospects than their worst possible outcomes, and researchers have proposed that this effect occurs because people strongly dislike risk. We challenge this proposition across seven studies. Though people seem to irrationally dislike risky prospects when preference is assessed with open-ended pricing measures, such as willingness-to-pay, people display rational responses toward risky prospects when preference is assessed using rating measures, such as ratings of expected enjoyment. This discrepancy does not seem to arise because these measures (a) focus on different components of the uncertainty, (b) rely on context-dependent versus normed scales, or (c) involve voluntarily opting into an uncertain situation. Accordingly, we find that people also display rational responses toward risky prospects with time measures (i.e., willingness-to-wait and anticipated time usage) and choice. We discuss alternative explanations and crucial implications of our effects for both theory and application. This paper was accepted by Yuval Rottenstreich, judgment and decision making.

21 February 2014 in Journal of Open Psychology Data
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Journal Article
Open access
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JSJoseph P Simmons
Joseph P Simmons
LNLeif D Nelson
Leif D Nelson
USUri Simonsohn
Uri Simonsohn
The data includes measures collected for the two experiments reported in “False-Positive Psychology” [1] where listening to a randomly assigned song made people feel younger (Study 1) or actually be younger (Study 2). These data are useful because they illustrate inflations of false positive rates due to flexibility in data collection, analysis, and reporting of results. Data are useful for educational purposes.