This article focuses on the relationship between Fintech and bank risk-taking behavior. Since Robo-Advisor is one of the mature applications of Fintech, we found that the development of Fintech will have a greater impact on small and medium-sized banks through the establishment of a Robo-Advisor model. This paper uses a benchmark regression model to analyze the municipal digital financial inclusion index compiled by Peking University and the annual report data of 155 small and medium-sized banks from 2011 to 2016. We found that the development of Fintech has significantly reduced bank risk-taking level. This result is still valid after the robustness test of replacing the bank’s risk-taking index and replacing the Fintech development index. We used the urban innovation index as an instrumental variable to deal with the endogenous problem, and obtained consistent estimation results. The test of the intermediary effect shows that the development of Fintech will affect the bank risk-taking through channels such as the bank’s internal interest margin, management capabilities, the bank’s external competition intensity, and residents’ saving willingness. Heterogeneity analysis shows the reduction effect of Fintech on bank risk-taking is more pronounced in banks in eastern and western regions in China, the large banks and the urban commercial banks.
The interplay between state‐led interventions and market‐driven forces has gained unparalleled prominence. This paper examines China's strategic use of government‐guided funds (GGFs) and their consequential impact on its national high‐tech zones (NHZs). Through an analysis of 1599 annual observations from 123 NHZs spanning 2007–2019, we reveal a compelling correlation between GGF investments and augmented industrial activity. Our findings indicate that NHZs benefitting from GGF allocations evidenced a significant 5.5% surge in industrial activity. Two underlying mechanisms drive this relationship. The leverage mechanism portrays GGFs as attractors of private social capital to tech‐centric ventures within NHZs. Meanwhile, the guidance mechanism underscores NHZs' strategic clustering of high‐tech sectors, amplifying benefits from shared resources and knowledge. Empirical analysis affirms both mechanisms, showing NHZs with robust social capital magnetism and tech clustering derive pronounced gains from GGF interventions. Our results carry practical implications for both policymakers and academicians, offering a nuanced understanding of the symbiotic relationship between fiscal strategies and industrial growth.
Purpose: While executive integrity is widely regarded as a valuable trait that enhances firm value, a critical puzzle remains: why do many firms still underinvest in executives with high integrity? This study explores this paradox by examining the unintended consequences of executive integrity on corporate risk-taking. Design/methodology/approach: Drawing on behavioral consistency theory (which posits cross-domain consistency in individual behavior) and regulatory focus theory (which links high integrity to a prevention focus prioritizing loss avoidance), we argue that executives with high integrity may exhibit risk aversion, leading to a reduction in corporate risk-taking. Our textual measure of executive integrity is derived from machine learning analysis of annual reports of Chinese listed firms (2000–2020), and corporate risk-taking is measured based on return on asset volatility and stock return volatility. The hypothesis is examined using regression analysis, followed by robustness tests. Findings: We find that firms led by high-integrity executives demonstrate significantly lower risk-taking. This effect is manifested through conservative corporate policies, including reduced M&A activities, lower leverage, higher liquidity, decreased R&D investment and less risky executive compensation. Furthermore, we find that the risk-taking propensity that executives face in their external environment, chairman tenure and analyst attention decrease, while a harsh environment increases the negative impact of executive integrity on firm risk-taking. Importantly, we show that such reduced risk-taking deviates from optimality: high-integrity executives weaken firms' capital allocation efficiency. Originality/value: Our research uncovers a dark side of executive integrity, which offers new insights for corporate governance, particularly in executive selection and risk oversight.
14 July 2026 in Emerging Markets Finance and Trade