12 December 2017 in Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
3 June 2021 in Accounting Horizons
SYNOPSIS: Financial analysts have two important roles in the capital market. In addition to their informational role, which has been widely studied, they play an important monitoring role. Similar to their informational role, their monitoring role might be negatively affected when they face conflicts of interest. Using a sample of Chinese firms, we show that if analysts are under pressure (i.e., housed in a brokerage firm where specific mutual funds hold large positions in a company covered by the analyst), their role in lowering the firm earnings management activities is significantly compromised. We find that the closer the business relationship between the mutual fund and the brokerage firm, the greater the firm earnings management. Our findings caution investors and regulators to heed the impact of client pressure on analysts' roles in financial markets.
26 February 2021 in Applied Economics
Using Chinese A-share listed industrial firms between 2009 and 2016, we find that greater religious influence is negatively associated with firm cost stickiness. This negative association is more significant for firms displaying higher agency costs, lower risk aversion, and a higher probability of corruption. Our findings highlight the importance of informal institutions such as religion on corporate behaviours such as cost stickiness.
29 August 2025 in Journal of International Money and Finance
11 October 2024 in The British Accounting Review
30 September 2025 in Journal of Accounting Literature
Purpose: While executive integrity is widely regarded as a valuable trait that enhances firm value, a critical puzzle remains: why do many firms still underinvest in executives with high integrity? This study explores this paradox by examining the unintended consequences of executive integrity on corporate risk-taking. Design/methodology/approach: Drawing on behavioral consistency theory (which posits cross-domain consistency in individual behavior) and regulatory focus theory (which links high integrity to a prevention focus prioritizing loss avoidance), we argue that executives with high integrity may exhibit risk aversion, leading to a reduction in corporate risk-taking. Our textual measure of executive integrity is derived from machine learning analysis of annual reports of Chinese listed firms (2000–2020), and corporate risk-taking is measured based on return on asset volatility and stock return volatility. The hypothesis is examined using regression analysis, followed by robustness tests. Findings: We find that firms led by high-integrity executives demonstrate significantly lower risk-taking. This effect is manifested through conservative corporate policies, including reduced M&A activities, lower leverage, higher liquidity, decreased R&D investment and less risky executive compensation. Furthermore, we find that the risk-taking propensity that executives face in their external environment, chairman tenure and analyst attention decrease, while a harsh environment increases the negative impact of executive integrity on firm risk-taking. Importantly, we show that such reduced risk-taking deviates from optimality: high-integrity executives weaken firms' capital allocation efficiency. Originality/value: Our research uncovers a dark side of executive integrity, which offers new insights for corporate governance, particularly in executive selection and risk oversight.