We examine the impact of ambiguity, or Knightian uncertainty, on the capital structure decision, using a static tradeoff theory model in which agents are both ambiguity and risk averse. The model confirms the well-known result that greater risk—the uncertainty over outcomes—leads firms to decrease leverage. Conversely, the model indicates that greater ambiguity—the uncertainty over the probabilities associated with the outcomes—leads firms to increase leverage. Using a theoretically based measure of ambiguity, our empirical analysis presents evidence consistent with these notions, showing that ambiguity has an important and distinct impact on capital structure. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.
15 February 2011 in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
We examine the relation between chief executive officers’ equity incentives and their use of performance-sensitive debt contracts. These contracts require higher or lower interest payments when the borrower’s performance deteriorates or improves, thereby increasing expected costs of financial distress while making a firm riskier to the benefit of option holders. We find that managers whose compensation is more sensitive to stock volatility choose steeper and more convex performance pricing schedules, while those with high delta incentives choose flatter, less convex pricing schedules. Performance pricing contracts therefore seem to provide a channel for managers to increase firms’ financial risk to gain private benefits.
23 March 2006 in Financial Markets and Portfolio Management
We study the effects of cartel participation on top corporate managers. Although a strong public interest exists in regulating price fixing, we find little evidence that either corporate governance or the legal system holds managers of cartel firms accountable. Instead, managers of cartel firms enjoy greater job security, receive higher cash bonuses, and more aggressively take profits from appreciated stock option awards. Legal sanctions against individual managers are infrequent, with enforcement actions focused on corporations rather than their officers. Managers seem to use concealment strategies actively to limit detection of cartel membership by their boards and auditors. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.