15 July 2026 in SSRN Electronic Journal
BGP prefix hijacking compromises Internet routing reachability and may lead to large-scale traffic misdirection and service disruption, making it a critical security threat to the stable operation of the backbone Internet. Although mechanisms such as RPKI have reduced this risk, eliminating hijacking remains difficult because of practical deployment and availability trade-offs. Existing detection methods mainly focus on individual hijacking events and provide limited insight into which autonomous systems (ASes) are more likely to become hijackers. To address this gap, we construct positive and negative AS observation-window samples from multi-source public routing data and extract structured features from AS-PATH changes and MOAS states, together with image features from historical prefix-announcement behavior. We then propose PHD-RG, a multimodal fusion framework for discovering potential BGP prefix-hijacker ASes. PHD-RG uses structured features as the primary discriminative modality and introduces image-based information through gated residual correction, enabling end-to-endclassification. ExperimentalresultsshowthatPHD-RGwiththeSwin T image encoder achieves strong overall performance, reaching an AUC of 98.40% and an accuracy of 93.42%. In an operational screening scenario where hijacker instances account for only 2% of the candidate pool, PHD-RG needs to inspect only the top 5% of risk-ranked ASes to cover 91.0% of hijacker instances, reducing the verification workload by 95.0%.Theseresultsdemonstrateitspractical value for routing-security risk verification.
10 April 2026 in Computer Networks