Elena Pagnin

Elena Pagnin

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Elena Pagnin

Chalmers University of Technology and University of Gothenburg

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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19 October 2017 in Security and Communication Networks
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
EPElena Pagnin
Elena Pagnin
AMAikaterini Mitrokotsa
Aikaterini Mitrokotsa
An emerging direction for authenticating people is the adoption of biometric authentication systems. Biometric credentials are becoming increasingly popular as a means of authenticating people due to the wide range of advantages that they provide with respect to classical authentication methods (e.g., password-based authentication). The most characteristic feature of this authentication method is the naturally strong bond between a user and her biometric credentials. This very same advantageous property, however, raises serious security and privacy concerns in case the biometric trait gets compromised. In this article, we present the most challenging issues that need to be taken into consideration when designing secure and privacy-preserving biometric authentication protocols. More precisely, we describe the main threats against privacy-preserving biometric authentication systems and give directions on possible countermeasures in order to design secure and privacy-preserving biometric authentication protocols.

9 November 2016
Verified
Book Chapter
Open access
PDF file
DFDario Fiore
Dario Fiore
AMAikaterini Mitrokotsa
Aikaterini Mitrokotsa
LNLuca Nizzardo
Luca Nizzardo
EPElena Pagnin
Elena Pagnin
Homomorphic authenticators (HAs) enable a client to authenticate a large collection of data elements \(m_1, \ldots , m_t\) and outsource them, along with the corresponding authenticators, to an untrusted server. At any later point, the server can generate a short authenticator vouching for the correctness of the output y of a function f computed on the outsourced data, i.e., \(y=f(m_1, \ldots , m_t)\). Recently researchers have focused on HAs as a solution, with minimal communication and interaction, to the problem of delegating computation on outsourced data. The notion of HAs studied so far, however, only supports executions (and proofs of correctness) of computations over data authenticated by a single user. Motivated by realistic scenarios (ubiquitous computing, sensor networks, etc.) in which large datasets include data provided by multiple users, we study the concept of multi-key homomorphic authenticators. In a nutshell, multi-key HAs are like HAs with the extra feature of allowing the holder of public evaluation keys to compute on data authenticated under different secret keys. In this paper, we introduce and formally define multi-key HAs. Secondly, we propose a construction of a multi-key homomorphic signature based on standard lattices and supporting the evaluation of circuits of bounded polynomial depth. Thirdly, we provide a construction of multi-key homomorphic MACs based only on pseudorandom functions and supporting the evaluation of low-degree arithmetic circuits. Albeit being less expressive and only secretly verifiable, the latter construction presents interesting efficiency properties.

1 November 2019 in IET Information Security
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
DFDario Fiore
Dario Fiore
AMAikaterini Mitrokotsa
Aikaterini Mitrokotsa
LNLuca Nizzardo
Luca Nizzardo
EPElena Pagnin
Elena Pagnin
Homomorphic authenticators (HAs) enable a client to authenticate a large collection of data elements and outsource them, along with the corresponding authenticators, to an untrusted server. At any later point, the server can generate a short authenticator vouching for the correctness of the output y of a function f computed on the outsourced data, i.e. . The notion of HAs studied so far, however, only supports executions of computations over data authenticated by a single user. Motivated by realistic scenarios in which large datasets include data provided by multiple users, we study the concept of multi‐key homomorphic authenticators. In a nutshell, multi‐key HAs are like HAs with the extra feature of allowing the holder of public evaluation keys to compute on data authenticated under different secret keys. In this paper, we introduce and formally define multi‐key HAs. Secondly, we propose a construction of a multi‐key homomorphic signature based on standard lattices and supporting the evaluation of circuits of bounded polynomial depth. Thirdly, we provide a construction of multi‐key homomorphic MACs based only on pseudorandom functions and supporting the evaluation of low‐degree arithmetic circuits.

25 October 2014
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
EPElena Pagnin
Elena Pagnin
CDChristos Dimitrakakis
Christos Dimitrakakis
AAAysajan Abidin
Aysajan Abidin
AMAikaterini (Katerina) Mitrokotsa
Aikaterini (Katerina) Mitrokotsa

9 November 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
AYAnjia Yang
Anjia Yang
EPElena Pagnin
Elena Pagnin
AMAikaterini (Katerina) Mitrokotsa
Aikaterini (Katerina) Mitrokotsa
Gerhard HanckeGerhard Hancke
Gerhard Hancke
DWDuncan S. Wong
Duncan S. Wong
Distance-bounding (DB) protocols are cross-layer authentication protocols that are based on the round-trip-time of challenge-response exchanges and can be employed to guarantee physical proximity and combat relay attacks. However, traditional DB protocols rely on the assumption that the prover is in the communication range of the verifier, which might not be the case in multiple access control scenarios in ubiquitous computing environments or when we need to verify the proximity of our two-hop neighbour in an ad-hoc network. In this paper, we extend traditional DB protocols to a two-hop setting i.e. when the prover is out of the communication range of the verifier and thus, they both need to rely on an untrusted in-between entity to verify proximity. We present a formal framework that captures the most representative classes of existing DB protocols and provide a general method to extend traditional DB protocols to the two-hop case. We analyse the security of two-hop DB protocols and identify connections with the security issues of the corresponding one-hop case. Finally, we demonstrate the correctness of our security analysis and the efficiency of our model by transforming five existing DB protocols to the two-hop setting and we evaluate their performance with simulations.