Chaeshin Chu

Chaeshin Chu

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Chaeshin Chu

Division of International Affairs, Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency, Cheongju, Republic of Korea

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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30 April 2020 in Osong Public Health and Research Perspectives
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
IKInho Kim
Inho Kim
JLJia Lee
Jia Lee
JLJihee Lee
Jihee Lee
ESEensuk Shin
Eensuk Shin
CCChaeshin Chu
Chaeshin Chu
SLSeon Kui Lee
Seon Kui Lee
This study aims to evaluate the risk assessments of coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) in the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC), from the point of detection to the provision of basic information to the relevant public health authorities. To estimate the overall risk of specific public health events, probability, and impact at the country-level were evaluated using available information. To determine the probability of particular public health events, the risk of importation and risk of transmission were taken into consideration. KCDC used 5 levels ("very low," "low," "moderate," "high," and "very high") for each category and overall risk was eventually decided. A total of 8 risk assessments were performed on 8 separate occasions between January 8th to February 28th, 2020, depending on the detection and report of COVID-19 cases in other countries. The overall risk of the situation in each assessment increased in severity over this period: "low" (first), "moderate" (second), "high" (third), "high" (fourth), "high" (fifth), "high" (sixth), "high" (seventh), and "very high" (eighth). The KCDC's 8 risk assessments were utilized to activate national emergency response mechanisms and eventually prepare for the pandemic to ensure the containment and mitigation of COVID-19 with non-pharmaceutical public health measures.

30 April 2025 in Osong Public Health and Research Perspectives
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MYMoonsoo Yoon
Moonsoo Yoon
NFNuha Fairusya
Nuha Fairusya
TNThao Le Nhu Nguyen
Thao Le Nhu Nguyen
DJDiomarys Ishaura Jimenez-Baez
Diomarys Ishaura Jimenez-Baez
VPVichuta Prak
Vichuta Prak
CCChaeshin Chu
Chaeshin Chu
Objectives: The study aimed to analyze the core capacities to implement World Health Organization International Health Regulations (IHR) in 6 countries: Indonesia, Cambodia, Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, Ghana, and the Republic of Korea. Methods: Secondary data from relevant databases and reports, including the electronic State Party Self-Assessment Annual Reporting mechanism and global health security index, were used to assess health security in these countries. Descriptive statistics summarized the basic features of the scores, and a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis was subsequently performed to identify factors affecting health security scores while highlighting key similarities and differences between countries. Results: Early warning and event management emerged as the primary strength in most countries. Common opportunities included international commitments and immunization programs. In contrast, many countries shared weaknesses related to the policy, legal, and normative frameworks for IHR implementation, as well as challenges in human resources, chemical event management, and radiation emergency preparedness. Recurring threats involved issues such as biosafety, biosecurity, dual-use research and the culture of responsible science, infection control practices, coordination between public health and security authorities, laboratory supply chain vulnerabilities, and communication with healthcare workers during public health emergencies. Conclusion: In order to counter future global health threats, countries should prioritize enhancing surveillance capacity (early warning and event management) as well as the immunization indicator (vaccination rates for human and animal diseases, including the national vaccine delivery system).

30 April 2025 in Osong Public Health and Research Perspectives
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
CCChaeshin Chu
Chaeshin Chu
Global health security threats in the post-coronavirus disease 2019 era include dense urban populations, increased human–animal proximity, migration driven by political or economic instability, climate change, humanitarian crises, antimicrobial resistance (AMR), and the misuse of biological research—including the accidental or intentional release of high-risk pathogens. The foundational preparation for these threats is to establish a robust, resilient public health system based on universal health coverage. The World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations must continue to promote global solidarity by maintaining core capacities such as surveillance, national laboratories, and epidemiological investigations of emerging infectious diseases, with timely reporting and information sharing within the global health security community. A One Health approach is essential for addressing AMR. Infection prevention and control must be enhanced to reduce healthcare-associated infections in medical facilities. Additionally, regulations concerning biosafety and biosecurity should address dual-use research of concern as well as the accidental or intentional release of highrisk pathogens from laboratories. Global health security is a collective responsibility because these threats know no borders and require coordinated action.

1 January 2025 in Journal of Global Health Science
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
VKVides Abraham Kyuta
Vides Abraham Kyuta
EKErick Kinyenje
Erick Kinyenje
FNFairusya Nuha
Fairusya Nuha
GAGerald Aluma
Gerald Aluma
KOKennedy Mensah Osei
Kennedy Mensah Osei
CCChaeshin Chu
Chaeshin Chu
Kyuta VA, et al. J Glob Health Sci. 2025 Dec;7:e30. https://doi.org/10.35500/jghs.2025.7.e30

30 April 2025 in Global Health & Medicine
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CCChaeshin Chu
Chaeshin Chu
The Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) was established in 2004 after the SARS epidemic. As a national disease control agency, KCDC strengthened its capacities for global health security based on experiences from some important issues such as the Influenza A/H1N1 pandemic (2009), the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome outbreak in Korea (2015), the Zika epidemic (2016), and COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2024). KCDC can make or revise infectious disease prevention and control related law, and collect, manage and analyze disease data from all the local public health centers and medical institutions in Korea. Based on the indicator-based surveillance, event-based surveillance and laboratory-based surveillance, KCDC conducts risk assessment for public health threats and has full responsibility as a competing authority in responding to outbreaks on a legal basis, which is specified in the national disaster framework. All quarantine stations in airports and sea ports belong to KCDC, and individual international travel history data at point of entries are linked to the National Health Insurance Services Database and medical doctors can access the database when the symptomatic individual visits the clinics/hospitals to check his/her travel history in the affected countries. This is a backbone to identify and notify imported infectious diseases from local clinic/hospitals to KCDC. Based on risk assessment in KCDC, KCDC triggers the Emergency Operations Center to respond. This KCDC-centered public health governance with centralized, comprehensive surveillance and response is one of the model cases from the health security perspective to consider for countries that are to establish new national public health institutes in the post-COVID-19 era.