R. Daniel Bressler

R. Daniel Bressler

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R. Daniel Bressler

Columbia University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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29 July 2021 in Nature Communications
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Journal Article
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RBR. Daniel Bressler
R. Daniel Bressler
Many studies project that climate change can cause a significant number of excess deaths. Yet, in integrated assessment models (IAMs) that determine the social cost of carbon (SCC) and prescribe optimal climate policy, human mortality impacts are limited and not updated to the latest scientific understanding. This study extends the DICE-2016 IAM to explicitly include temperature-related mortality impacts by estimating a climate-mortality damage function. We introduce a metric, the mortality cost of carbon (MCC), that estimates the number of deaths caused by the emissions of one additional metric ton of CO2. In the baseline emissions scenario, the 2020 MCC is 2.26 × 10‒4[low to high estimate −1.71× 10‒4to 6.78 × 10‒4] excess deaths per metric ton of 2020 emissions. This implies that adding 4,434 metric tons of carbon dioxide in 2020—equivalent to the lifetime emissions of 3.5 average Americans—causes one excess death globally in expectation between 2020-2100. Incorporating mortality costs increases the 2020 SCC from $37 to $258 [−$69 to $545] per metric ton in the baseline emissions scenario. Optimal climate policy changes from gradual emissions reductions starting in 2050 to full decarbonization by 2050 when mortality is considered.

13 October 2021 in Scientific Reports
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RBR. Daniel Bressler
R. Daniel Bressler
FMFrances C. Moore
Frances C. Moore
KRKevin Rennert
Kevin Rennert
DADavid Anthoff
David Anthoff
Many studies project that climate change is expected to cause a significant number of excess deaths. Yet, in integrated assessment models that determine the social cost of carbon (SCC), human mortality impacts do not reflect the latest scientific understanding. We address this issue by estimating country-level mortality damage functions for temperature-related mortality with global spatial coverage. We rely on projections from the most comprehensive published study in the epidemiology literature of future temperature impacts on mortality (Gasparrini et al. in Lancet Planet Health 1:e360–e367, 2017), which estimated changes in heat- and cold-related mortality for 23 countries over the twenty-first century. We model variation in these mortality projections as a function of baseline climate, future temperature change, and income variables and then project future changes in mortality for every country. We find significant spatial heterogeneity in projected mortality impacts, with hotter and poorer places more adversely affected than colder and richer places. In the absence of income-based adaptation, the global mortality rate in 2080–2099 is expected to increase by 1.8% [95% CI 0.8–2.8%] under a lower-emissions RCP 4.5 scenario and by 6.2% [95% CI 2.5–10.0%] in the very high-emissions RCP 8.5 scenario relative to 2001–2020. When the reduced sensitivity to heat associated with rising incomes, such as greater ability to invest in air conditioning, is accounted for, the expected end-of-century increase in the global mortality rate is 1.1% [95% CI 0.4–1.9%] in RCP 4.5 and 4.2% [95% CI 1.8–6.7%] in RCP 8.5. In addition, we compare recent estimates of climate-change induced excess mortality from diarrheal disease, malaria and dengue fever in 2030 and 2050 with current estimates used in SCC calculations and show these are likely underestimated in current SCC estimates, but are also small compared to more direct temperature effects.

6 December 2024 in Science Advances
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Journal Article
Open access
AWAndrew J. Wilson
Andrew J. Wilson
RBR. Daniel Bressler
R. Daniel Bressler
CICatherine Ivanovich
Catherine Ivanovich
CTCascade Tuholske
Cascade Tuholske
CRColin Raymond
Colin Raymond
JSJeffrey G. Shrader
Jeffrey G. Shrader
Recent studies project that temperature-related mortality will be the largest source of damage from climate change, with particular concern for the elderly whom it is believed bear the largest heat-related mortality risk. We study heat and mortality in Mexico, a country that exhibits a unique combination of universal mortality microdata and among the most extreme levels of humid heat. Combining detailed measurements of wet-bulb temperature with age-specific mortality data, we find that younger people are particularly vulnerable to heat: People under 35 years old account for 75% of recent heat-related deaths and 87% of heat-related lost life years, while those 50 and older account for 96% of cold-related deaths and 80% of cold-related lost life years. We develop high-resolution projections of humid heat and associated mortality and find that under the end-of-century SSP 3–7.0 emissions scenario, temperature-related deaths shift from older to younger people. Deaths among under-35-year-olds increase 32% while decreasing by 33% among other age groups.

1 October 2024 in APSA Preprints
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RBR. Daniel Bressler
R. Daniel Bressler
RTRobert F. Trager
Robert F. Trager
ADAllan Dafoe
Allan Dafoe
A large literature has argued that offensive advantage makes states worse off because it can induce a security dilemma, preemption, costly conflict, and arms races. We argue instead that state welfare is u-shaped under offensive advantage. We assess the offense-defense balance by considering a model where two states choose arms levels and decide whether to attack. High defensive advantage is first-best because the arms burdens required to deter attacks and maintain peace are low. High offensive advantage is comparatively worse because war is likely, but war tends to be smaller in scale, quicker, and less costly. Intermediate offensive advantage is worst because high arms burdens are required to deter attacks while wars, when they occur, are larger, longer, and more destructive. We discuss historical examples of this phenomenon, including the Warring States periods in China and Japan, the Imjin War, the Federalist Papers, Napoleonic Europe, and the World Wars.